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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to examine and refine the concept of consocia- 
tional democracy, a political system in which political leaders of 
socially and politically distinct groups interact with one another in. 
an atmosphere of moderation and mutual accommodation.
A discussion of the explanations, suggested by various political 
theorists, of the political behavior and relationships in a consocia- 
tional democracy produced a list of the basic characteristics of the 
system. Characteristics which were either ambiguous or ascribable to 
other political systems were eliminated.
The Benelux countries— Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—  
are three countries which have moderate political systems similar to 
the general definition of a consociational democracy. TJsing the Bene­
lux countries as test cases made it possible to refine further those 
characteristics isolated in the theoretical discussion, and to synthe­
size a model of the political activity of a consociational democracy. 
This model, in turn, provided the basis for a theory as to why elites 
of distinct social groups are able to interact in s. moderate, mutually 
accommodative fashion.
The results of this study suggest, in broad terms, that consocia­
tional democracy exists because most individuals within the system see 
this type of interaction to be the normal and proper approach to poli­
tics. In actual political practice, relations between different 
groups or leaders are based upon mutual recognition of legitimacy. 
Distinct social groups and their political leaders recognize the right 
of other social groups to participate in the political system, and the 
individual groups recognise the right of their political leaders to 
act as spokesmen for the group and to interact freely with the leaders 
of other groups. Finally, there is-the common recognition that the 
political system, represented by the sovereign authority of the State, 
is the legitimate forum for political activity.
As an afterword, there is a brief discussion as to the possible 
impact of the domestic practice of consociational politics on a coun­
try^ approach to foreign affairs.
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN THE 
BENELUX COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION
\ 'S
In the study of comparative politics* many authors have sought 
to produce theories explaining why different political systems behave 
in different ways. One pattern of political behavior that is now under 
scrutiny is called consociational democracy. ^ Consociational democracy 
is a tezm which is applied to countries which are divided into distinct 
social blocs, and which, at the same time, exercise a moderate style of 
political activity through the adoption, by the elites, of certain tech­
niques of conflict management or conflict avoidance.
Various authors have sought to define the essential nature of this 
arrangement, to explain where it comes from and how it works. So far, 
several theories have been produced, some of which agree with one an­
other while others do not. The purpose of this thesis then is to exa­
mine the various theories of consociational democracy and to synthesize 
a coherent theory of consociational politics from them.
Before explaining how this is to be done, let us examine the ori­
gin of the term 1consociational democracy.1 Democracy refers, of 
course, to a political system where the government is subject to popu­
lar control. Consociation can be thought of as being a cross between 
association and confederation. An association is a group of individuals 
formally organized for the pursuit of a specific common purpose or 
specific common purposes, but members are not required to surrender 
their individuality to the group. Similarly, a confederation is a group
2
3of provinces or countries (pre-existing political entities) which have 
banded together to form a single political entity for certain purposes, 
but which retain a strong measure of autonomy. Consociation refers to 
the relationship between a set of distinct religious or social groups 
which, for various purposes have come to act as a single unit even 
though retaining some measure of their- individuality. Consociational 
democracy then is consociational behavior in the political system.
The first step in examining this pattern of political activity 
is to discuss the various theories of consociational democracy in terms 
of their relative merits. Then, to test the results of our discussion, 
we must examine the theory in the context of several political systems. 
In this regard, the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg, are the most suitable for our purposes.
The Benelux countries possess certain qualities which make them 
useful as objects of study. First, all three countries have extensive 
histories of representative government as well as traditions of modera­
tion in their political system. The practice of moderate politics 
means that the countries already fulfill one of the broad definitions 
of consociational democracies. Extensive histories of representative 
government give us a larger amount of political data than would be 
available in a country whose regime was only thirty or forty years old.
All three countries are in the same general geographic area and 
share traditions of Western culture, general though these traditions 
may be. Comparing the Netherlands and India, on the other hand, would 
be more difficult because cultural differences would be far more appar­
ent; the Dutch are a Western society while the Indians have strong 
traditions of caste and religion influencing their behavior. By
examining countries with common Western traditions, we eliminate a 
number of variables which could otherwise cause considerable confusion,
Belgium and the Netherlands are about the same size while Luxem­
bourg is considerably smaller. Size is not, in ana of itself, impor­
tant except that larger countries, such as France, Germany, Italy,
Great Britain, and the United States, have been more often studied 
and, indeed, form the foundation for many of the existing models of 
socio-political behavior.
The Swiss, the Austrians, the Scandinavians, and the tiny coun­
tries like Liechtenstein are all potential subjects for further study, 
and, indeed, the first two of these countries have undergone consider­
able scrutiny in previous examinations of consociational politics. The 
Benelux countries, however, present a special case in that they are at 
present working together in close harmony as an international unit, the 
Benelux Economic Union. While the Scandinavian countries have formed 
the Nordic Council, their efforts have been more limited than the Bene­
lux countries. What is the reason for this cooperation between the 
countries of Benelux? If the countries are indeed consociational, it 
may be that this has an impact on their international behavior. We 
shall speculate on this possibility when the examination of the coun­
tries in terms of consociational democratic theory is complete.
The study of consociational democracy will proceed in four 
stages:
(1) a discussion of the major theories of consociational democ­
racy;
(2) an examination of the governments and historical development 
of the Benelux countries;
(3) an analysis of the circumstances in the individual countries
5in terms of the theoretical information supplied in Chapter 
One 5
(!*) the construction of a theory explaining the nature of con­
sociational behavior, and a model describing the special 
qualities of political interaction associated with consocia­
tional democracy.
In addition, our study will allow us to speculate about the implications 
of consociational democracy on both national and international politics.
Before beginning this discussion of consociational theory, there
are several terms which recur in this thesis which need to be defined:
Elite - here meaning the political elite, is a collection of individuals 
who are involved in the formulation of policy or who seek to in­
fluence the policy-making process for the benefit of a group for 
which they are spokesmen.
Social bloc, social group, bloc, group - used interchangeably, these 
terms refer to any collection of individuals who share a common 
bond of language, religion, ideology, or culture, and who see 
themselves as distinct from other groups.
N.B. Although these units are distinct, this does not imply that 
they are static. Members of one group may elect to join another 
group. The important quality is that, on the whole, the members 
recognize commonality within a group which is different from 
other groups.
Cleavage - a fundamental division in society created by adherence of 
individuals to differing attitudes, religions, etc.
Segmented society - a society which has cleavages.
Over-lapping or cross-cutting cleavage - a characteristic or attitude
shared by individuals which cuts across cleavages, e.g., Catholi­
cism would be an over-lapping cleavage in the case of French 
workers and French middle class.
Reinforcing cleavage - a cleavage which accents existing cleavages, 
e.g., Catholicism reinforces the ethnic cleavage between the 
largely strong Catholic Flemings and the largely secular Walloons.
Political system - the activities of, and relationships between, leaders 
and any other individuals who exert an influence on governmental 
policy and the way it is determined, e.g., political parties, 
voters, judges, etc. Also, rules of order.
Pattern - a recurring relationship between elements in a political 
system.
Model - a collection of patterns which is used to describe the aggre­
gate activity in a political system by relating various facets 
of activity.
Theory - an explanation of the circumstances which cause and maintain 
the interrelated patterns of a model.
7NOTES— INTRODUCTION
^Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International 
System," European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975)s378. See also 
Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: the'Cases of the
Netherlands and Switzerland," International Social Science Journal 23,
3 (1971):355.
CHAPTER I 
'THEORIES OP CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY
Consociational democracy is a relationship between political 
elites and social groups. Various authors have used different approaches 
to assemble theories of how a consociational democracy works and why.
This chapter will discuss, first, why consociational politics demands 
a model separate from other major models, and then will examine differ­
ent theories of consociational democracy, comparing their respective 
merits or demerits.
, Gabriel Almond envisioned two possible models of society in a 
country With a representative democratic political system. The Anglo- 
American model represents a relatively homogenous society characterized 
by many over-lapping social groups (cross-cutting or over-lapping cleav­
ages). The other, the fragmented model of Italy, for example, is 
characterized by predominantly non-over-lapping groups (reinforcing 
cleavages).^ Almond draws these models from what is known as the plural­
istic system, which is based upon three assumptions;
(1) Society contains groups with discernible differences of race, 
religion, or language. At the same time, these groups are 
technically equal in the eyes of the law. A Catholic banker 
receives the same treatment as a Jewish farmer.
(2) Ehe different groups are small in that no one group has a 
clear majority.
(3) There are certain cross-cutting affiliations. For example, 
regardless of the nature of a country, all citizens are citi­
zens. These common bonds are sufficient to allow all indivi­
duals to be classed as members of a single unit, a state for
9example. At the same time, there are differences which show 
the country to he made up of several different sub-units, 
yielding some non-over-lapping affiliations, which is to say, 
reinforcing cleavages.^
Half Dahrendorf proposed that social conflicts occur more often 
within societies with a predominance of reinforcing cleavages. Socie­
ties with overlapping cleavages predominating, on the other hand, tend 
to have fewer conflicts because individuals moderate their opinions to 
fit the various positions of the several groups to which they adhere.^ 
The United States, which has mostly over-lapping cleavages, is charac­
terized by a moderate, relatively calm political scene. There is a 
slow rate of political turn-over, few politicians being ousted after 
one term or less, and non-campaign activity tends toward moderation 
and compromise. In Italy, on the other hand, where cleavages are 
strong and reinforcing, competition is more severe. The possibility 
of compromise to achieve goals is small.-
However, there is a flaw in the approach of Almond and Dahrendorf. 
The two authors, who associate moderation with over-lapping cleavages 
and competition with reinforcing cleavages, do not take into account 
conditions in the Netherlands or Switzerland. In those countries, 
moderate political activity, which they identify with the over-lapping 
model, occurs within societies with strong, reinforcing cleavages.
Various authors, such as William Mitchell, Sidney Verba, and 
David Truman, have sought to modify the original model to include these 
countries.^- Their general conclusion was that moderate politics did 
not rely exclusively on social structure, but arose also from tradi­
tions. One source of these traditions is ’habit background', that is, 
the political system was moderate because the citizens were accustomed
10
to moderation. Traditions of moderation could also arise from 'rules 
of the game', the way people approach politics.
Almond explains how the over-lapping model works: an individual
who is making political choices is subject to ambiguous influences from 
over-lapping attitudes of the many groups to which he adheres. On the 
other hand, a Swiss, in a segmented society, makes political decisions 
based largely on the influence of habit background or rules of the game, 
as his political attitudes arise from the homogeneous ideas of his par­
ticular group. What is the nature and source of these influences? How. 
can we differentiate between moderate countries of Almond’s model and 
those countries which present both a moderate political atmosphere and 
reinforcing cleavages? Consociational democracy, as described earlier, 
displays this combination of moderation and reinforcing cleavages. An 
examination of consociational theories should enable us to determine, 
at least in part, the answers to these questions.
There are several different theories and understandings about how 
a consociational democracy works and how it comes into being. Some of 
these theories focus exclusively on the interaction among the elites 
of distinct social groups. Others include the - interrelationship be­
tween the elites and the social blocs, i.e., between elites, between 
elites and blocs, and between blocs. A third group focuses on the pro­
cess of cultural growth of the whole society, examining the political 
culture and attitudes of the elites and masses rather than technical 
qualities of moderate interaction, such as relying on formal rules of 
order to restrict large-scale dissent in parliamentary debates.
Two writers who deal exclusively with the nature of elite inter­
action axe Robert Putnam and Gerhard Lehmbruch. Putnam, who uses the
11
term "coalescence” to describe the consociational mode of elite, inter-, 
action, suggests that this coalescence is the result of elites mutually 
attempting to halt the spread of fragmentation in their political sys­
tem. If the effort is successful, the system can be maintained. If 
elite efforts should break down, the system would break down. Putnam 
suggests that . . the behavior of American political elites in the 
years before the Civil War may be interpreted as an attempt to create 
conditions of elite coalescence. The last major social institution to
g
crack along regional lines was the party system."
The problem with Putnam's argument is that the system he is 
examining, in this case the U.S.A., had many over-lapping cleavages.
The combatants could not be differentiated exclusively by regional ori­
gin. Northerners fought for the South, Southerners for the North, and 
large numbers of individuals remained neutral. Hence, Putnam's idea 
of fragmentation control is not based upon control of friction between 
discrete units of society. Another problem with Putnam is that his 
intention is to explain consociational politics as being an aberration 
in normal elite interaction rather than as a different system. To Put­
nam, coalescence is a type of conflict management rather than a normal 
way elites go about their business.
Another author who focuses on elites is Gerhard Lehmbruch. Lehm­
bruch, when describing elites.of consociational countries, argues that 
the social groups are distinct and are held together through compromise 
and mutual accommodation on the part of the elites. He suggests that 
elites are mutually accommodating because the attitudes of the existing 
elite structure support such action, and, as new elite members enter 
the system, they are socialized into the attitudes. Lehmbruch suggests
12
five influences which craate the attitude pattern:
(1) Some basic national symbols are accepted by all the elites 
of the system;
(2) Pa st violence is seen as having had traumatic effects,' i.e., 
violence is not seen as a profitable means of problem-solving;
(3) There has been a tradition of representative government; that 
is, the elites representing the different groups have tradi­
tionally had an opportunity to discuss their views;
(]+) There exists intense informal communication among the elites 
which is not open to non-elites;
(5) Given the number of groups involved and their relative size, 
majorities can be formed only by bargaining.7
Lehmbruch's list of influences, although they describe conditions 
which probably exist in a consociational country, does not show whether 
or not it describes a pattern of elite behavior unique to a consocia­
tional system. In addition, we need to know more about the ability of 
the elites to maintain their own legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, 
and about the ability of those same elites to deal with new elite mem­
bers who are not so completely inculcated into the values of the tradi­
tion.
A proper description of elites should reflect their ability to 
deal with changing circumstances and attitudes, especially in view of 
the conflicts associated with distinct social groups. Changes in cir­
cumstances and disaffection with on-going policies can cause further 
fragmentation (creation of fringe groups) and lead to the appearance 
of extremist leaders who owe no allegiance to the system.
If questions of on-going elite legitimacy and non-cooperative 
leaders were only lesser concerns, and the system operates under influ­
ences which approached Lehmbruch's ideal, can his list be considered a 
description of only a consociational state? Under Almond's model, the
13
United States is a country with over-lapping social cleavages and a 
moderate political system. Comparing qualities of the United States 
to qualities of Lehmbruch's model, it is immediately obvious that at 
least four out of five influences are, indeed, characteristic of the 
United States,too. Although leaders disagree as to methods and pro­
grams, they all claim to seek the well-being of the whole country; hence, 
they share some basic symbols. Past violence, such as the Civil War or 
labor riots, are seen as traumatic and generally unprofitable. Ameri­
can traditions of representative government predate the creation of the 
country by centuries. The fourth influence, informal channels of com­
munication, are found in traditions of informal button-holing and smoke- 
filled rooms which abound in the United States.
The fifth influence, that majorities can be formed by bargaining 
only, is found in Germany and Great Britain, two countries which have 
political parties based on cross-cutting affiliations. Although it does 
not occur all of the time, we find circumstances where no party was able 
to gain an absolute majority and the most successful party was obliged 
to seek to form a coalition with one or more parties.
Lehmbruchfs list of influences, then, can be said to be common to 
moderate political systems, but.it cannot be said to be the exclusive 
domain of consociational democracy.
The elite analyses by Lehmbruch and Putnam are inadequate as 
descriptions of consociational systems, although Lehmbruch's does give 
some possible clues as to the source of consociational activity. The 
two authors do, however, show, by the nature of the flaws in their argu­
ments, the need for establishing the relationship between the elites and 
the social groups as a mainstay of a consociational theory, i.e., the
flaws show a need for additional information. Without such a relation­
ship being shown, a study which showed Lehmbruch's qualities could be 
about any moderate polity.
One author who examined this relationship was James Dunn. In his 
work, "Consociational Democracy and Language Conflict: A Comparison of
the Belgian and Swiss Experiences," Dunn suggests that a particular 
ethos had been established such that the elites behave in an accommoda­
tive fashion in a consociational country because the society as a whole
o
had come to expect it of them.
Arend Lijphart also approached this question of the relationship 
between elites and society. Lijphart's image of consociational elites
places them in the context of their country. He argues that the conso­
ciational system will succeed to the degree "(l) . . . that the elites 
have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of 
the sub-cultures . . (2). . . that they have the ability to trans­
cend cleavages and to join in common efforts with the elites of rival
sub-cultures; (3) • • . (that they have) a commitment to the maintenance 
of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability; and 
(U) . . . that the elites understand the perils of political fragmenta­
tion.
These elite characteristics were generated by a fragmented 
society. Lijphart, in a discussion on the crisis in Northern Ireland, 
tried to explain why consociational politics does not work in that situa­
tion. Important Northern Irish leaders, both Protestant and Catholic, 
do not display the characteristics we have summarized. The Eeverend Mr. 
Paisley, for example, sees the perils of fragmentation as being less 
important than the protection of Ulster Protestant values and forms.
He makes no attempt to transcend cleavages, nor does he seek to accom­
modate divergent interests. The cumulative result of elite activity in 
Northern Ireland is that stability is, at best, a cease-fire rather 
•than a lasting peace. Although Paisley does not typify all Northern 
Irish leaders, he is in a sufficiently strong position to negate the 
efforts of more moderate leaders.
It can be said that the presence of the first two characteris­
tics in Lijphart*s list indicate the presence of the second two. Will­
ingness to bind the interests of various groups together, rather than 
seeking to dominate, indicates that elites define the system as more 
than the will of their individual group. As such, the elites will tend 
to seek to fulfill the first two characteristics. Hence, only the first 
two need be considered in detail.
Lijphart, in addition to the above elite characteristics, suggests 
six socio-political characteristics which he felt typified consocia­
tional countries, some of which fit Northern Ireland, while others did 
not. As Lijphart*s concern in this article was Northern Ireland, the 
model is rather sketchy, seeking only to prove its applicability or in­
applicability in that setting.
The first two socio-political characteristics that Lijphart sug­
gests are the presence of a multiple balance of power,^ and the pre­
sence of distinct social cleavages.^ Drawing upon the experience of 
the Dutch, Lijphart suggests that three or more distinct sub-cultures, 
no one of them able to fonn a majority alone, are necessary to prevent 
the domination of a minority by a majority. Such domination could occur 
in a bi-cultural state like Northern Ireland, with consequent political 
instability. The problem with the multiple balance of power concept is
16
that it is not numbers of groups, but rather biases and attitudes vjhich 
maintain peace or generate hostility between groups. Three groups in 
a five-group setting, for example, could band together against the 
other two. Likewise, in a bi-cultural setting, peace is maintained be­
cause moderates seeking co-existence are predominant, or extremists, 
seeking absolute division, create disorder, drive the moderates and 
their attitudes into hiding.
Lijphart next argues that if there were several distinct social
12
groups, a grand coalition might be acceptable to the various parties.
In simpler terms this means that, if necessary, it would be possible tc 
unite.the elites of all of the major groups into a single government. 
This does not mean that grand coalitions, which occur only in excep­
tional ^circumstances, must appear regularly, but rather that the crea­
tion of such a body is not Impossible and is facilitated by the exis­
tence of a number of major groups.
Fourthly, Lijphart suggests a need for some degree of national 
13solidarity. J Many Catholics in Northern Ireland identify with their 
Catholic compatriots in the Republic rather than with Ulster Protes­
tants. Protestants often treat the Catholics as conquered subjects, 
at worst. As a result, the Northern Irish have few common bonds of 
shared experience or tradition. Owing fealty to the same monarch, a 
symbol which joins the Flemings and Walloons of Belgium, has no effect 
in Ireland. The Belgian king is a Belgian rather than a Fleming or 
Walloon, but to the Irish Catholics, who have their own traditions 
(many kingdoms, destroyed centuries ago), the Anglo-Scots, Ulster Pro­
testants and their Queen are little more than foreign oppressors.
The fifth characteristic that Lijphart suggests is a small
1j,
population. * In this regard, he sees two interdependent qualities.
(1) In a society where groups are very distinct, the population
must he small lest the intense, elite interaction demanded 
in managing many distinct groups becomes impossible to carry 
out.
(2) The elite membership will deal with primarily domestic rather 
than foreign affairs.^ 5
Lijphart1 s ideas here come from the notion held by others, such as 
Lehmbruch, that consociational countries tend to be neutral in the 
field of foreign affairs. He offers as an explanation of that neutral- . 
ity that there are not enough leaders to act decisively domestically 
and abroad and that strong cleavages are politically relevant only in 
smaller countries. ^  The quality of leaders is, however, not really a 
function of size of polity. Athens in the fifth Century B.C., for 
example, had a population of 100-200,000, and even fewer citizens; yet 
it produced many great leaders and thinkers. Furthermore, the politi­
cal relevance of social cleavages also has nothing to do with size. 
Unrest among Hispanics of Blacks over civil rights in the United States 
is as much a product of exacerbated social cleavages as a language^ 
group confrontation in a small country. Smallness is not significant, 
then, in and of itself.
Lijphart!s sixth point is that social cleavages must be distinct. 
It is important to understand that a segmented society must be more 
than purely an array of social groups which are different or which per­
ceive inequities. Unlike social groups in the United States, they must 
be discrete, with each group having its own political elite and there 
being relatively little intemingling with other groups.
The final socio-cultural characteristic that is mentioned is that 
the external threats to a state can impress upon the leaders the need
18
17for intergroup cooperation. ' Lijphart adds that the threat must be 
recognized by all of the rival- sub-cultures as a common threat. Catho­
lics in Northern Ireland, for example, might not view Irish Republican 
intervention as a threat, but rather as liberation.
In the discussion of the six socio-cultural characteristics, the 
notion that politically distinct social groups exist is most important.
A multiple balance of power among distinct groups, although conceivably 
present in a consociational system as a conflict-restraining influence, 
is not a guarantor of mutual restraint. Mutual restraint, as a norm, 
is found in the acceptability of a grand coalition as a normative model. 
This characteristic can, in turn, be expressed in the broader terms of 
Li jphart's elite characteristics, since the power to form a grand coali­
tion demands the elites have the support of their own sub-culture and 
are recognized by other sub-cultures as a legitimate political voice.
The actual presence of a grand coalition is merely the pinnacle of a 
broader political consensus.
Of the remaining three influences, two, small population and ex­
terior threats, while possibly having an impact, are not reliable 
guarantors of peaceful interaction. The former was shown to be irrele­
vant, while the latter’s validity depends on the relationship betwTeen 
the threat and the social group, i.e., it must be a threat to all par­
ties in order to encourage joint action.
Finally, there is "some measure of national solidarity," a very 
important value as it reflects the ability of elites to convince masses 
that common action is more than a passing phenomenon. Indeed, it 
represents the unity needed against external threats. Hence, Lijphart’s 
ideas of social cleavages, elite interaction with society, and national 
solidarity are significant socio-cultural characteristics.
Lijphart's descriptions of elites and- socio-cultural characteris­
tics gives us an idea of how a consociational country is able to func­
tion. Why are the masses willing to live in a system like this rather 
than demanding a government which deals exclusively with their problems 
and is divorced from all other social blocs?/ This question becomes 
especially important when there is trouble between social groups. As
was mentioned earlier, James Bunn suggests that society has been cul-
18
tured to expect cooperative behavior on the part of elites. How does
this process of culturing come about? Another way of looking at this
question is how does a consociational democracy come into being? The
answer will indicate whether a consociational system could be produced
in any country with distinct cleavages, or whether it is a system which
apose because special circumstances had existed at one time.
Two views concerning the culturing process are those of Hans
Daalder and Yal Lorwin. Lorwin suggests that consociational practices
arise from a tradition of localism, i.e., social groups in a consocia-
19tional country were once geographically distinct. ' In his discussion 
on this concept, he suggests that these distinct groups experienced 
gradually increasing political interaction in areas of mutual interest. 
At the same time, however, the bulk of political power remained in the 
hands of the local sub-groups long after a single political unit was 
formed. The relationship was confederal. More power began to be trans­
ferred to the central regime as more and more joint decisions were
demanded of the sub-groups. This process led, eventually, to the crea-
20tion of a consociational state out of a confederal body. Lorwin also
notes that in spite of this transfer, there remains strong identifica-
21tion with the old localisms.
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Hans Daalder agrees, by and large, with lorwin*s position of 
growing interaction between distinct groups. In his treatment, how­
ever, he puts more emphasis on the involvement and importance of elites 
in the transition.
In Daalder's words, "Consociationalism is . . • not a response
to the perils of subcultural splits, but the prior reason why the sub-
22
cultural divisions never did become perilous." Instead of elite
accommodation being the force that restrains political division, ". . .
earlier consociational practices facilitated the peaceful transition
23
towards newer forms of pluralist political organization. . ."
Daalder and Lijphart differ in their analysis of elites. Lij- 
phart is similar to Putnam in that the focus of his study is on the 
present, a present where elite interaction is forced into certain pat­
terns by the problems of fragmentation. For Daalder, on the other hand, 
both the patterns of elite interaction and the array of politicized 
social groups reflect the way in which both elites and masses feel the 
political system should be organized. Daalder presents an image of 
consociational democracy that suggests that the elite practice of mutual 
forbearance and accommodation is a product of a long process and is 
infused in the political culture of the nation. Can a consociational 
pattern be reproduced elsewhere? Daadler says yes, it can be. Elite 
culture, he argues, should not be viewed as a process which only re­
flects objective cleavages, but rather as an independent variable, 
leaders, in short, should be viewed as people who lead, not merely 
people who temporarily counteract other political forces. They should 
be* seen as the elites of states with the capacity to influence develop­
ments, especially over the long run. By using the available repre­
21
sentative traditions and cultures, Daalder feels that stability "between 
distinct groups could be achieved without destroying cultural inte­
grity and without resorting to violence for nation-building.^
Lorwin* s and Daalder's descriptions of the culturing process 
present possible images of how conflict was1 avoided during developmen­
tal stages. Still, we need to know which argument is stronger. If 
Lorwin is correct, then certain physical relationships between the 
groups are necessary; particularly, they should begin contact while 
separated by distance. There should be no economic or social need for 
a person to move from one region into the other, i.e., no group is 
being driven by a desire to expand, by an outside threat, or by econo­
mic scarcity to move into its neighbor’s territory. Daalder's view, 
on the other hand, depends less on physical relationships between 
groups and more on who is in charge. A strong, active elite can effect 
changes in attitudes and circumstances if they have an opportunity to 
stop trouble before it gets out of hand. Neither writer totally con­
tradicts the other; yet each is different. To determine which argument 
is most useful, or if both or neither are useful, we must compare their 
descriptions with actual circumstances.
As was mentioned earlier, it is known that the Benelux countries 
exhibit qualities which may be deemed consociational. This study, 
then, will proceed in two stages: an introduction to the government
and history of each of the three countries, and an examination of the 
socio-political systems. The first stage will present a summary of 
how each country's government operates and how each country developed. 
This summary will, in turn, give us some insight into whether Lorwin's 
or Daalder's ideas are most useful.
22
The second stage, the examination of the socio-political system 
of the three, will he based on Lijphart1s list of characteristics.
This analysis will allow us to make any additions that are necessary 
and to further refine the ideas that we have of how a consociational 
democracy works and how it is different from other systems.
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CHAPTER II
THE BENELUX COUNTRIES: GOVERNMENirS AND HISTORIES
One facet of political interaction that was not discussed in the 
previous chapter was the distribution and interrelationship of author­
ity among1 the different branches of government. The reason for this is 
that, although the basic patterns of government in various countries 
may be similar, many interrelationships will be influenced by attitudes 
or circumstances which are unique to the individual countries. It 
v^ ould be extremely difficult to draw meaningful generalizations con­
cerning those aspects of a political system which yield consociational- 
ity because some functions which are technically the same are different 
in practice. It is in this context that we will examine the govern­
ments and the socio-political development of the Benelux countries, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This discussion will provide 
a background for the examination of elites and socio-political charac­
teristics in the next chapter. In addition, the examination of socio­
political development should allow us to resolve the questions raised 
by Daalderfs and Lorwinfs proposals on the culturing process.
All three of the Benelux countries are constitutional monarchies. 
They each have a monarch, a Cabinet, a legislature, and free and open 
elections. It is at this point that similarities begin to break down. 
Thje three monarchs arose from different circumstances and, perforce, 
have different characteristics. The Dutch monarchy, for example, has
25
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lost most of its power over the last century and a-half. Today, its 
powers have become severely limited and virtually no real power is exer­
cised by the monarch. However , the powers of the Grand Dukes of Luxem­
bourg are far broader than those of the Dutch monarch, as they still in­
clude a wide array of royal prerogatives. The Grand Duke, if circum­
stances demanded it, could control or dissolve the legislature and rule 
by decree.**' Even without the presence of a crisis, the Grand Duke
exerts considerable influence as he hand picks his ministers and
2
appoints the members of the Council of State (described below).
When the Kingdom of Belgium was established, the monarchy and its
function were sharply defined. Most European monarchs remained distinct
from their legislature and, gradually, the royal authority passed from
King to Parliament until the monarch reigned while the legislatures
ruled. For Belgium, however, the monarchy was defined as being an
3
integral part of the legislative system of checks and balances. The
King acts as overseer to the legislature and can, in the event of a
crisis, act decisively to break legislative dead-locks. The advantage
enjoyed by the King here is that while other monarchs have surrendered
their power to the legislature, the Belgian King is legally bound to
be ready to act if circumstances demand and to remain involved as a
k
non-partisan force in the legislative process.
An important quality of all three Benelux monarchies is the per­
son in the position. While, legally, there are potentially powerful 
monarchs in Luxembourg and Belgium and a limited monarch in the Nether­
lands, in actual practice the strength of the office of monarch lies 
in the holder of the title. If an individual is actively involved in 
policy-making, the monarch is strong, whether he has constitutional
powers or not. If he is content to allow his Cabinets to decide policy 
and deal with crises, then regardless of constitutional authority, he 
is outside of the mainstream of political activity and serves a primar­
ily ceremonial function.
The legislatures of the three countries also differ one from the 
other. In each of the three countries, the lower house (Netherlands—  
Second Chamber, Belgium— House of Representatives, Luxembourg— Chamber 
of Deputies) is elected by popular suffrage. All three countries use 
proportional representation, i.e., seats in the house are distributed 
to the parties according to the percentage of votes each party won in 
the election. (Phis is a common practice in most European countries.
The upper house of the Netherlands, the First Chamber, is elected 
by the Provincial Councils in the same way that legislatures of German 
Lender still send and pre-1900 American States once sent representatives 
(Senators) to one house of the national legislature. The Belgians, on 
the other hand, choose their upper house through a combination of royal 
appointments and elections from the lower house (the selections are in 
different proportions). Luxembourg's upper house, the Council of State, 
has no real legislative power and is little more than a collection of 
advisors to the Duke and Chamber of Deputies who are appointed by the 
Duke.
While the Dutch upper and lower houses are both involved in legis­
lation, the Belgian and Luxembourger upper houses are left, by and large, 
out of the legislative process. They can suggest legislation or changes 
in existing legislation, but their actual purpose is to oversee events 
and, if necessary, adjudicate questions of constitutionality.
The real power in most democratic states in Europe is found in
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the Cabinet, or Government as it is sometimes known. For the Dutch, a 
Cabinet minister is expected to make decisions on policies which do not 
demand legislative action on his own initiative, or after consultation 
with other ministers. Dutch ministers can be, at times, their own mas­
ters. In Belgium, on the other hand, all policy is subject to Parlia­
mentary debate. To institute or change policy, a minister must first 
justify it before the Parliament. Luxembourg lies somewhere in the 
, middle as policy is subject to the review of the Council of State which 
would, in turn, bring any questions to the Chamber of Deputies.
A final quality which can be used to describe all three countries 
is that all three have a constitution which is based upon rules of order, 
guidelines for interaction, rather than being a description of ’correct 
thinking' , which ties the political system to the maintenance of parti­
cular socio-political relationships, what in Article 1+5 of the Irish 
Constitution are known as "Directive Principles of Social Policy.” Al­
though it is only a framework for cooperation, consociationalism must 
also depend upon the willingness of the actors to deal with one another 
in an atmosphere of mutual trust.
In summary, we can describe the three countries according to the 
relationships between the monarch, the legislature, and the Cabinet.
The Dutch have a system where the Cabinet holds most of the effective 
power while the legislature acts as a check on their power. The monarch 
has only a minor role. In the Belgium government, on the other hand, 
the most important feature is the Parliament with the Cabinet working 
closely with the legislators themselves. The King is an important actor 
and is also bound to the legislature. Finally, Luxembourg’s government 
has a strong Cabinet with a strong system or review and recall. The
monarch has great potential influence and can counter-balance either 
the Cabinet or the Chamber of Deputies.
* * *
One fact that is apparent from the discussion on the governments 
of the Benelux countries is that, although they border upon one another, 
each country has undergone different influences. The task now is to 
describe and analyze these influences. This examination will focus 
upon the circumstances surrounding national intergration such as out­
side influences and their impact, the relationship between groups, and 
political changes, such as the movement toward universal suffrage and 
its effects.
The Netherlands
24 The Netherlands declared its independence from Spain in 1^71.
At the time, the country was more a loose confederation of provinces 
than a united state. The national government consisted of a council 
of representatives from the Provincial Councils. While the day-to-day 
mechanics of local government were carried out by the Provincial Coun­
cils, the representatives to the national government met in what Daalder 
describes as M. . . something more akin to a series of negotiations be­
tween independent states than to a national legislature."^ There was,
however, a strong recognition of a community of interest such that all
parties recognized themselves as part of the Republic of the Nether-
7
lands.
The people in the original set of provinces were all Calvinists, 
a fact which undoubtedly enhanced their ability to work together. There 
were, however, local differences and traditions which could make indi­
viduals suspicious of the motives of their neighbors. There were also
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distinctions in dialects which ranged from minor local idioms in most 
provinces to a'completely different dialect in Groningen.
During the 1620’s, the religions situation was complicated when 
the Netherlands annexed parts of Brabant and Limburg, two Catholic 
provinces which were part of the Spanish Netherlands, or what we now 
know as Belgium and Luxembourg. This had little affect upon general 
Dutch policy because the country as a whole was heavily involved in ex­
pansion of trade, colonization, and wars with Spain, Prance, and Eng­
land which occurred intermittently until the mid-1700’s. In time, how­
ever, Catholics would become a significant political force.
Prom about 1792 until l8lJ+, the Netherlands fell under the con­
trol of Prance. Although French liberalism, a mixture of democratic 
ideals and anti-clericalism, had an influence, the Netherlands remained 
a semi-independent state, first as the Batavian Republic and then as a 
kingdom under one of Napoleon's brothers. The administration and inter­
nal policy remained in Dutch hands.
In l8ll+, at the time of the fall of the First French Empire, 
William of Orange, head of one of the most important families in the 
Netherlands, was proclaimed King of the United Netherlands. One of his 
first acts was to persuade the Congress of Vienna to allow him to ad­
minister the provinces of the Spanish (Austrian as of 1713) Netherlands. 
These provinces made up what was to become, in I83O, Belgium and Luxem­
bourg. Although the Congress did give these to William, Belgium even­
tually revolted in I83O and Luxembourg was granted independence in I867.
During William’s reign, the arrangement of Parliament (the States- 
General, as it is known) was altered at the suggestion of the King's
o
Belgian subjects so that it became bi-cameral. Instead of being purely
a body of Provincial representatives, a council of notables was added 
as a second (upper) chamber. In 182|8, the States-General was altered 
again, in response to the local unrest arising from political disturb­
ances sweeping all of Europe. The chamber of Provincial representatives 
became the First Chamber, replacing the Council of notables. A new
9Second Chamber was henceforth to be elected by direct popular vote.
During the period I8llj.-l8l4.8j, large changes began occurring with­
in the political structure of the Netherlands. A liberal movement 
arose from the ashes of French influence.^ To counteract this move­
ment, the Calvinists began organizing into the Anti-Revolutionary Party 
(ARP) and were,dedicated to retention of older, more traditional values. 
Oyer time, an upper-class, less fundamentalist faction of the ARP broke 
free and formed the Christian Historical Union. After I8I4.8, the 
Socialist and Catholic Parties also gained strength. The establishment 
of universal suffrage in 1919 established these five groups as the con­
trolling forces in Dutch politics. Today each group, by government 
fiat, has its own newspaper, is entitled to specific times on television, 
and is a discrete unit within Dutch society.
In the Netherlands today, sociologists describe this pattern of 
discrete units as verzuiling, or pillarization. ^  The continued viabil­
ity of verzuiling is in doubt today because of the number of splinter 
parties which appeared during the I960*s. The splinters appear, how­
ever, to be losing ground back to the older Big Five parties and the 
system is returning to the status quo ante. I will attempt to document 
this in the next chapter.
In terms of the culturing processes suggested by Lorwin and Daal­
der, circumstances in the Netherlands support both arguments. The
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government of the provinces remained largely a local concern for over 
two hundred years, while national politics per se were handled as a 
• community of interest. When interest groups became ideological or 
religious, rather than provincial, the elites were already accustomed 
to mutual accommodation. Hence, Lorwin's idea that local bodies gradu­
ally grew together is supported.
At the same time, Daalder's suggestion that a desire for coopera­
tion predated unification is also necessary as it helps explain, first, 
how the Dutch provinces were able to get together in the first place 
and, second, it explains how the system was able to survive the transi­
tion from regionally oriented attitudes to religious and ideological 
ones. Lorwin's idea is bound to the maintenance of localism as the 
foxmdation of elite cooperation. Daalder, by focusing on the result 
of culturing, allows for the decline of such regional bias in the con­
tinuing maintenance of the political system as well as change in circum­
stances.
Belgium
Belgium came into existence in 1789 when there was a momentarily 
successful revolt against Austria, which had gained the territories 
from Spain in 1713* Prior to 1789 > Belgium was a set of discrete pro­
vinces, only a few of which had enjoyed short periods of independence or
semi-independence. There was no history of either ethnic or political
12
unity among any of the provinces. The revolt in 1789 had been brewing 
for only a few years, arising from the effects of the French revolution, 
which were spreading across Europe. The parties involved were Walloons, 
a French-speaking group from the southeastern half of the territory, 
and Flemings, who came from Flanders in the north and west and who spoke
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a dialect of Dutch. The revolt lasted only a short time before a new 
army arrived from Austria and retook control.
In 1792, France annexed the territory outright, giving the area 
French courts and a French administration. The Walloons soon embraced 
French liberal ideas and actively supported the French. Among the Flem­
ings, the nobility, clergy,.and peasantry found themselves being con­
trolled by the middle classes who had also embraced the fashionable
French language and French ideas. Until l8ll|, Belgium was run complete-
13ly by French-speakers (Francophones) from both Wallonia and Flanders.
When William I of the new Kingdom of the United Netherlands took 
control of Belgium and Luxembourg in 181I+, he began instituting reforms 
whereby the Flemings would be administered in Flemish while the Walloons 
would be administered in French. In spite of this, and indeed many 
other conciliatory gestures by the King, there remained distrust and 
friction between the Calvinist Dutch and the Francophone Walloons and 
Flemings. The conservative Catholic Flemish-speakers, influenced by the 
Catholic clergy, trusted neither group.^
In I83O, a revolt began in Brussels, which soon spread throughout 
Belgium. A liberal constitution was written, establishing Belgium as 
a monarchy with a strong legislature. The Belgium leaders invited Leo­
pold of Saxe-Coburg to be the new King. His acceptance gave the coun­
try a monarch who was neither Flemish nor French, but rather would be 
Belgian. In addition, since Leopold was uncle to Victoria, then British 
heir apparent, Belgium gained strong support from the pre-eminent power 
in Europe. Although the war with the Netherlands dragged on until 1839 > 
Belgium was assured of an independent existence.
The unity of the l830's gave way to the factionalism of the lSi+O's.
3k
Exponents ,of anti-clerical French liberalism began forming- a strong 
political movement, especially among the Francophone middle-class.
This movement was opposed by a strong, traditional, pro-Catholic body 
which was led by the old nobility and the clergy. In addition, in 181;6, 
a vocal body of Flemings began protesting the decline of Flemish culture 
caused by the disdain in which the Francophone elite held all things 
Flemish. A study committee appointed by King Leopold examined Flemish 
grievances and Francophone counter claims that Flemish was only the 
language of the uneducated. The committee concluded that the Flemings 
were correct in their contentions, so Leopold began a program of annual
19competitions to encourage Flemish art and literature.
The four-way split of Catholic-secular and Flemish-French was 
limited in its scope during the l800’s because only a small part of the 
population was enfranchised. The Catholic Party, which had begun mak­
ing significant gains during the latter half of the century because of 
troubles brewing within the Liberal Party, worked, nevertheless, for 
the enhancement of Flemish rights. During the 1880’s, for example, the
Catholics passed laws making it mandatory that the courts and adminis-
16
tration would use Flemish with those who spoke it.
With the coming of the twentieth century, a French-inspired 
Socialist movement began making significant political gains in the in­
dustrial regions of Wallonia. Even before the establishment of univer­
sal suffrage^ a small offshoot of the Liberal Party was calling itself 
the Socialist Party. The two movements, the Walloon industrial workers 
(Socialists) and the Flemish peasants needed only the change to univer­
sal suffrage and the concurrent increase in potential voting support 
to blossom forth as significant parties.
World War I was a time of great internal turmoil “because, while
some Flemings embraced the Germans as liberators, others fought in
trenches under officers who spoke a different language. King Albert
rewarded the loyal Flemish over Walloon protests by granting universal
17suffrage. The language conflict was now fully under way.
Since 1920, most political activity has centered on making adjust­
ments to ease tensions between religious and secular groups, and between 
the language groups. Between 1920 and 1932, Flemish rights and privi­
leges were gradually improved until finally, a language boundary was 
established such that the country was divided into two language regions, 
Flanders and Wallonia. Each region was to be administered in its own 
language. The laws of the 1880's had dealt only with specific cases, 
i.e., only if a person could not speak French was any consideration 
made. The 1932 law provided that all of Flanders would automatically
18be administered in Flemish. Brussels, the capital, was to be bilingual.
During the early 1950fs, a new problem arose where there was a 
question whether King Leopold III had behaved properly during the fall 
of Belgium in 191*0. A referendum showed that the King was supported by 
5k% of the people. A breakdown of the vote showed that the Flemings 
supported by over 60%, while the Walloons and Bruxellcises (French- 
speaking citizens of Brussels) supported the King by only 1+6 and 1+8%. 
Rather than risk a crisis, Leopold abdicated in favor of his son 
Baudouin.19
A second major dispute of the 1950’s fell along religious-secular 
lines. A question over the relationship between the parochial and state 
schools was resolved in a great compromise called the Pact Scholaire 
which guaranteed equal standing to both groups.
During the late 1950's and the 1960's', protest rallies took place 
over the legal position of language groups. The growth of Yolksunie, 
the Flemish language party, caused a concurrent growth of a Walloon 
counteiTpart, the Walloon Rally. This growth caused the Constitutional 
Amendment of 1970, only the third amendment ever to the Belgian consti­
tution. This amendment created cultural councils for each region to
act as advisors to the government on the problems of the individual 
20regions. Problems over the creation and implementation of this 
amendment have caused the downfall of several governments. The possi­
bility of a resolution of the problems is very real, however. Further 
discussion of this situation will be presented in the next chapter.
.44 In Belgium, the forces of division, especially during the last 
sixty years, have been titanic. The ability of the elites to hold the 
country together and to at least limit the violence is remarkable.
Similar circumstances have led to bloodshed and revolt elsewhere.
What knowledge does the case of Belgium give us with regards to 
the question of culturing? Lorwin!s localism gains obvious support 
from Belgium as it describes the mechanics of both creation and main­
tenance. The provinces of Belgium had been administered individually 
for some time yet had been under a common overlord, whether Spanish, 
Austrian, French, or Dutch. French influences had undermined the dis­
creteness of the divisions as there was now an overlap in the worst 
possible place; the entrepreneurs and administrators in Flanders, though of 
Flemish stock, had become "foreigners" by adopting the French values and 
language. The control of much of the political sphere by these Franco­
phones between I83O and 1932 led to considerable unrest among the non- 
Francophone Flemings who felt that the normal channels for airing
grievances or for seeking justice had been Closed to them. The rein­
forcement of localism through the 1932 language boundary and the 1970 
Amendment will probably reestablish a viable balance without dividing 
the country into two separate countries, as it establishes an atmosphere 
of Flemings solving Flemish problems and French solving French problems.
Daalder's thesis also holds because recognition of the rights of 
Flemings and a willingness to find a common solution demands the founda­
tion of commonality of interest and desire. Belgians, both Flemings 
and Walloons, had been willing to work together in 1789 and were pre­
pared to do so again in I83O. If this had not been the case, Belgium 
would not have survived.
* An important aspect of the culturing process, which is involved 
in both Lorwin's merging localities approach and Daalder's approach of 
pre-existent accommodative elite attitudes and which emerges from the 
discussion, is the recognition by each social group of the legitimacy 
of the other social units*than themselves. The political system is 
malleable and can be altered to fit changes in circumstances or changes 
in. the prevailing mood of the people. The political events in Belgium 
over the last sixty years bear this out as the elites have sought to 
absorb Flemish and Walloon language parties and create circumstances 
which would remove the threats perceived by the two groups.
Luxembourg
Luxembourg presents a different set of circumstances to us than 
did its Benelux partners. Unlike the other two countries, Luxembourg 
has been a unified state for over one thousand years. The only time 
that it has not had its own administration was briefly during the 
fourteenth century and during the French occupations of 1792-l8li|.
Founded in 9&3 Count Sigfrid, Luxembourg was ruled by the same 
dynasty for several hundred years. A part of the Holy Roman Eknpire, it 
produced several Bnperors, one of whom greatly expanded the territory 
(it was reduced to one-third of its size in 1839) and raised it to the 
status of a Duchy. In li+lj.2, the dynasty died out and the Duchy passed 
into the hands of the last Duke’s cousin, the Duke of Burgundy. Control 
passed shortly thereafter to the House of Hapsburg, in-law3 to the Bur­
gundians. Luxembourg was to have famous Hapsburgs such as Charles V, 
the Holy Roman Snperor and King of Spain, as its Dukes.
During one of the endemic wars with France, Luxembourgers success­
fully resisted a French invasion. Pleased with his subjects, Charles 
arranged that a provincial council of notables should run the country 
in his absence. This arrangement continued for over two hundred years 
when, as with most of Europe, Luxembourg was invaded by revolutionary 
France.^
As with Belgium, Luxembourg was incorporated as a department or 
administrative district of France. Although there was a French-style 
liberal movement already extant in Luxembourg, even the liberals opposed 
the annexation. Sporadic fighting occurred for about ten years, cul­
minating in a large-scale revolt. Peace was restored by Uapoleon Bona­
parte, by then Emperor, who returned most of the control of local
2?
administration to the Luxembourgers. ■
French occupation had several influences on Luxembourg, most im­
portant of which is that it reinforced the sense of Luxembourger 
nationalism which had lain untested for some time. Catholics and secu­
lar liberals, who had been drifting apart, were drawn together against 
a common foe. At the same time, French administration caused the ideas
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of representative democracy and anti-clericalism to become more firmly 
entrenched. j
In l8li|, as previously mentioned, William I of the Netherlands 
annexed Luxembourg. This annexation was different from that of Belgium 
in that the Congress of Vienna made Luxembourg a Grand Duchy and Wil­
liam was its Grand Duke. The term Grand Duchy means that the ruler of 
the country was an autonomous sovereign, recognizing no higher author­
ity. Hence, William was sovereign of two separate countries, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. So, in spite of sharing a common monarch 
and administration, Luxembourg was more than a province of the Nether­
lands. In practical terms this distinction is probably unimportant, 
but it does give a psychological flavor of continuity to Luxembourg’s 
traditions of discreteness and semi-autonomy.
In 1839 > at the conclusion of the Datch-Belgian conflict, Luxem­
bourg was partitioned with Belgium annexing over two-thirds of its 
territory. The remaining territory remained under Dutch rule. During 
the 181*0’s, Lexembourg was granted a Belgian-style constitution, a 
measure which included direct election of deputies to a legislature 
which had for centuries been a council of appointed notables, together 
with representatives selected by cantonal and professional organiza­
tions. Although this constitution was restricted somewhat during the
late I85O's, parliamentary activity was in full swing by the time Luxem-
2k
bourg became independent in I867. Luxembourg became independent be­
cause the title of Grand Duke had passed to the family of Orange-Nassau, 
the junior line of the Dutch royal house. No real change had taken 
place in Luxembourg except that its tie with the Dutch had been severed. 
Luxembourg's government decided at the end of World War I that
1+0
the country needed an economic linkage with another country to enhance 
its own industrial capacity. Such a linkage was formed with Belgium in 
1921 when the two formed BLEU, the Be Igium-Luxembourg Economic Union.
Not only did this linkage put industrialization into high gear, it also 
restructured Luxembourger society. Luxembourg1 s factory workers, in 
1921, were predominantly Socialist and nominally Catholic. A substan­
tial part of the country1s electorate was still agricultural. Between 
1921 and the present, that arrangement changed substantially. The 
farmers moved to the city, bringing their more traditional attitudes. 
Government efforts to diversify the nation's industries from J0% steel 
into other areas led to the reordering of society through growth in
25
international banking and other services, rather than industrial work.
» t The changes taking place in Luxembourg led to the exacerbation of 
existing social divisions. Richard Rose and Derek Urwin examined poli­
tical development in various countries, among them Luxembourg. Their 
study focused upon the processes through which the lower classes, both 
workers and peasants, were brought into political organizations. Rose
and Urwin found that the conflict between secularism and religion led
26
to a segmentation of voluntary associations and the press. As workers 
and peasants found themselves becoming more politically involved, be­
cause of changes in the patterns of national political activity and 
organization, they were encouraged to join in voluntary politically- 
oriented associations such as peasants' leagues and labor organizations. 
Many of the lower classes were unwilling to join except within a tradi­
tional framework. The Christian party leaders and prelates provided 
27
this framework.
This study by Rose and Urwin is a propos to our study on Luxembourg
1+1
in that it points to the existence of a relevant and discrete social 
cleavage along religious-ideological lines. A cursory examination of 
changes in trade union memberships further supports this contention.
In 191+7» most industrial workers were members of socialist trade unions 
like the politically active Confederation Generale du Travaille du 
Luxembourg (C.G.T.), which had appeared during the pan-European social­
ist movement of the late 1800's. The C.G.T., like similar unions in
Prance and Italy, favored social reform, pacifism, and the dissolution
28
of national boundaries. At the time, the C.G.T. and a few smaller
socialist unions could draw only 2,300 members in toto. The number of
29
non-union workers was marginal.
Today, the trade unions form a markedly different array. Although
membership in the socialist unions has risen from 58*000 to 59,000, in
actuality, there is a strong division within the socialist ranks. While
the C.G.T. has 35*000 members, a more nationally-oriented union, the
Letzburger Arbechter Verband (L.A.V.), has grown in size to include
30
2lj.,000 members of the socialist bloc.
At the same time, two other unions which reflect other political
affiliations have also become politically prominent. The Federation
des Employes Privees du Luxembourg (F.E.P.), a moderate, secular body,
and the Letzburger Chrestliche Gowerkschaftsbond (L.C.G.B.), a Catholic
workers union, have attracted 18,000 and 15,000 workers, respectively.
These two unions, together with the L.A.V., have formed the Conseil
National des Syndicats. a government-sponsored sounding board for
31worker-oriented desires and grievances. A fifth major union, the 
railway employees union, falls neither into the camp of the Conseil nor 
of the C.G.T.
h2
The array of unions and the growing strength of the non-pan- 
European socialist unions suggests that, as Luxembourgers migrated to 
the industrial regions, individuals were not absorbed into existing 
groups but did indeed band into groups which carried over from their 
previous affiliations and which continue to reflect social divisions. 
Hence, there is a discrete division between Catholics and Socialists, 
and a division between various kinds of socialists.
This argument is very important to the thesis as a whole because 
it resolves the question of whether Lorwin’s localism or Daalder * 3 
elite influence is the proper foundation for the culturing process.
The Catholic prelates and party leaders organized the new workers into 
political forces and brought them into the political spectrum as.dis­
crete legitimate political units. The fact that these leaders were al­
ready involved in political activity with the secular opposition means 
that they were dealing with that opposition on the basis of mutual 
recognition of the legitimacy of the two parties, Catholics and secu­
larists, to exist in the political intrastructure; i.e., as Daalder 
suggests, elite cooperation predated interaction between politicized 
groups. Hence, Lorwin*s idea of separate groups growing together was 
not necessary to generate accommodative interaction between distinct 
socio-political units.
Once again the idea of mutual recognition of political legitimacy 
plays an important role in our discussion. In the case of Luxembourg 
and, as had been mentioned above, Belgium and the Netherlands, as the 
different groups found themselves gaining greater political leverage, 
they were not ostracised by the elites, but rather the elites made an 
effort to integrate the groups into the system as relevant political unit3.
h3
These two ideas, that the desire of elites to cooperate pre-dates 
the emergence of potential conflict between diverse groups and the 
mutual recognition of political legitimacy, describe the circumstances 
necessary to create a political system based on consociational democ­
racy. We can say, then, that consociational democracy arises from a 
common recognition of the legitimacy of the regime, the agreed-to forum 
for interaction among the elites, and that the system is maintained by 
the legitimization of new political forces as they enter the system.
This chapter has described the governments of the Benelux coun­
tries and has examined the historical development of their political 
cultures. From this discussion, we have suggested how consociational 
democracy arises and, in broad terms, how a system using such a pattern 
is maintained.
The next step is an examination of more specific characteristics 
of how the system operates. This analysis will allow us to determine 
whether the elite and socio-political characteristics defined in the 
previous chapter are sufficient to describe the patterns that arise 
from the culturing process we have examined, or whether more or fewer 
characteristics are needed. In addition, we should be able to discover 
parameters of individual characteristics which will allow us to deter­
mine systematically whether other countries are consociational. The 
interrelationship of political parties, for example, may indicate the 
presence of social cleavages or the ability of elites to work together.
1*
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CHAPTER III
THE BENELUX COUNTRIES AND CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY
In the discussion on theories of consociational democracy, it was 
discovered that an adequate description of a consociational system must 
include an analysis of the relationships between elites, between the 
elites and society, and between the social blocs. The previous chapter 
indicated that, based on the theory that moderation between discrete 
units is the result of a culturing process, the three Benelux countries 
are consociational. We were left, however, with two questions. First, 
is there a pattern of activity which typifies consociational politics, 
yet which is more specific than saying accommodative elite interaction 
produces moderate politics? Second, can the characteristics which make 
up this pattern be described in a systematic way so that the presence 
or absence of consociational political patterns can be determined with 
maximum efficiency?
Arend Lijphart isolated several characteristics which together 
seemed to provide the pattern desired in our first question. These 
characteristics were:
(1) the presence of distinct social groups which are politically 
relevant;
(2) elites which have the ability to accommodate the divergent 
interests and demands of the blocs, and have the ability to 
transcend cleavages and join in common efforts with the elites 
of rival blocs;
(3) the existence of some degree of national solidarity and some 
national symbols.
1+6
Using the information provided in the previous chapter, we can 
examine Lijphart1s characteristics and determine their applicability 
or if more or fewer characteristics are needed. We should also be able 
to draw upon the previous chapter to determine if there are any parti­
cular points of social or political interaction which we can use to 
farther refine the characteristics.
Social Cleavages
We know, from the previous chapter, that social cleavages exist 
in the Benelux countries. This fact is not in and of itself remarkable, 
as virtually all European countries have some kinds of social cleavage, 
either language, religious affiliation, class, or ideological outlook. 
The difference between the Benelux countries and other countries is the 
way in which the social blocs behave politically. This section, then, 
will examine these differences in political behavior and the inter­
relationships which generate them. Finally, we will look at cleavages 
in the countries themselves to see how the relationship between cleav­
ages appears in practice.
In the discussion on theories of consociational democracy, it was 
mentioned that the relationship between political parties and social 
groups generated different types of political activity. In France, 
regional, ideological, and religious groups have been fragmented into 
sub-groups and many parties, with several parties representing a single 
bloc. For example, the Gaullists and the catch-all Popular Republican 
Movement represent traditional, right-of-center values. Competition 
between all parties is intense, with strong concentrations of larger 
parties at the ends of a left-right continuum vying with one another 
in efforts to woo the tiny parties inhabiting the center (moderates).
1*8
In Germany, or more properly the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
situation is different. Although there'; are distinctions of class, dia­
lect, religion and ideological preference, and regional distinctions, 
the political parties are 1 catch-all1 parties drawing strength from 
several social groups at once. This is the phenomenon of over-lapping 
social cleavages, and it produces a moderate political atmosphere.^
The Benelux countries lie somewhere between the two extremes.
They are different from France because their political activity tends 
toward moderation; but, unlike Germany, Benelux political parties tend 
to^reflect only one social bloc, such as Catholics, Flemings, or Social­
ists. In Derek TJrwin's words, the cleavages are institutionalized, pro­
ducing, in effect, a political system which moderates among discrete
political units. These units have their own media, trade unions, poli-
2
tical parties, and, in some cases, educational systems.
These political units were generated by the process described in 
the discussion on the historical development in Luxembourg in the pre­
vious chapter. As new groups were drawn into the political system, 
existing elites provided a framework which individuals could use as a 
channel for airing grievances or expressing desires. The political 
parties in a consociational country, therefore, are the visible politi­
cal elites of the individual social blocs.
The only problem, then, is showing the linkage between the social 
bloc and the political party. If the pattern of party identification 
is similar to the pattern of social cleavages, then we can say that the 
system is consociational. This relationship is useful to know because, 
first, it is the only real difference between the consociational and 
the moderate systems, and second, elite behavior can then be defined
1+9
in terms of party as well as individual behavior.
The linkage between the blocs and the parties can be shown by the 
level of party identification in the individual blocs, a high level 
indicating that the conditions which we describe do exist. If a low 
level appeared, the linkage would not be strong, and the political sys­
tem would show over-lapping rather than reinforcing cleavages.
The social cleavages in the Benelux countries are basically simi­
lar, with a few differences arising from individual circumstances. The 
basic divisions, common to all, are religion vs. secularism and a left- 
right ideological division. In the Netherlands, the basic divisions 
are complicated by religious sects and by social class. The religious 
parties, which have recently formed a loose association called the 
Christian Democratic Alliance or C.D.A., are the Catholic Party, lower 
class, fundamentalist Calvinists of the Anti-Revolutionary Party or 
A.R.P., and a middle- and upper-class party of less orthodox Calvinists 
called the Christian Historical Union (C.H.U.). Prior to 1972, these 
parties operated with complete independence, and it is only recently 
that they felt circumstances demanded they form a united front. The 
circumstances that caused this union will be discussed later.
The class division also manifests itself in the left-right ideo­
logical cleavage, the secular lower- and lower-middle classes belonging 
largely to the Socialists, while the rest of the secular middle class, 
together with the upper class, adhere to the Liberal Party. Although 
there are other splinters, over the long run these five blocs* have 
accounted for in excess of 85% of the voting population of the Nether­
lands.
*Catholics, Socialists, Liberals, strong Calvinist (ARP), weak 
Calvinist (CHU).
In Luxembourg, the formula of religious-secular and left-right 
accounts for the bulk of Luxembourg1 s politicized divisions. There is 
no real history of class conflict, and virtually everyone is a nominal 
Catholic. All Luxembourgers are at least bi-lingual, speaking Letzem- 
burgish, a local dialect, and either Frencii or German. The use of 
Letzemburgish provides a linguistic over-lap, preventing social ostra­
cism for speaking a different language. Likewise, both French and Ger­
man are used in schools, so no students are held back because of langu­
age.
There are a few regional isms in Luxembourg which have been grow­
ing over time. The north-west is largely rural and produces conserva­
tive, traditionalist Catholics. The new industrial areas, in middle 
and eastern Luxembourg, have been growing only in the last fifty years, 
also have this flavor, having gained many individuals who migrated from 
the rural north-west. In the older industrial areas of the south, there
t
is an admixture of different groups in Luxembourg-City, and concentra­
tions of specific groups in other cities, most notably the strong 
Communist bloc in Esch-zur-Alzette.
Belgian cleavages also follow the basic format described above. 
With the addition of the language and regional cleavages— Flemish in 
Flanders, French in Wallonia, German in the Cantons of the East, and 
both French and Flemish in Brussels— a new complication is added in that 
all political parties are required by law to have a separate political 
machine for each area. In other words, there are religious and secular 
blocs and ideological blocs which are unique to each region. Flanders, 
Wallonia, and Brussels also have a party unique to the area whose pri­
mary impact is only in national politics. These are the language
51
parties, intent on defending cultural integrity.
An interesting part of Belgium cleavages is that Wallonia tends 
politically toward the traditions of French liberalism while Flanders 
maintains older values. Wallonia tends to be more secular and desires 
greater amounts of government-supplied social welfare. Flanders tends 
to be more moderate, and Catholics still hold a strong position poli­
tically.
One factor which must be heavily emphasized is that the major 
cleavages in all three countries are strong and politically relevant. 
Here Yal Lorwin's idea of localism as an influence re-emerges. Coun­
tries like Germany and Great Britain have each engendered an ethos 
where>all groups feel that the state has over-shadowed diversity.^
This ethos moderates the effect of social cleavages because individuals, 
when policy places no threat to them directly, are willing to go with 
the general flow of national policy. Lorwin suggests, as a result,
that in spite of common recognition of cleavages, the political impact
c
of the cleavages is light to moderate. Characteristics of cleavages, 
such as the media, education, party identification, and socio-economic 
organizations such as labor unions, and the bureaucracy, will, with a 
few exceptions, display a low to medium range of cleavages.^ In Bri­
tain, the only characteristics that really show a strong cleavage arise 
from the perquisites of class, hence education and elements of the 
bureaucracy will show social segmentation. In Germany, there are few 
characteristics which do not fit into a middle-range or low-range cate­
gory. -This means that it would be very difficult to determine someone's 
social identification by determining his political affiliation.
This conclusion is borne out by the actual circumstances in the
countries* In Germany, J0% of ail industrial workers ‘belong* to the
7
Social Democratic Party. The remainder are broken up among the other
major parties and, indeed, form the primary foundation for the strength
8
of virtually all parties. This figure is lower than for Scandanavian,
British or Belgian Social Democratic Labor parties and also lower than
Communist-Socialist voting blocs in Prance and Italy. It was, however,
more homogeneously working class than British Labor. It was a working-
class party, but not a party of the whole working class. A similar
situation exists in Great Britain.
In the Benelux countries, on the other hand, the situation is the
reverse from Great Britain or Germany, Characteristics of religious-
party identification, trade union membership, media, and education all
9
indicate a high degree of social segmentation. This segmentation 
translates into relatively strong predictibility with regards to the 
relationship between social bloc and party preference.
The Netherlands is the only country for which a direct study was 
available. Tables A and B show the relationship between religious and 
party preference and between occupation and party preference. Table A 
shows a drift from the less orthodox Dutch Reformed Church to the secu­
lar ranks, while the Catholic and Reformed Churches (orthodox) remain 
strong. This trend is especially interesting in view of the general 
decline of Calvinism over the last two centuries. It was during the 
early 1800's that the Dutch Reformed Church broke free politically as 
an upper-class movement. Since 1900, the Dutch Reformed Church has 
undergone a serious decline, falling from being the largest church (i+8%) 
to third place (28%) behind the Catholics and the Reformed Church.^
The Catholics grew to from about 35% to probably through normal
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population growth. While the Reformed Church has remained at a stable
12level, the secular bloc has grown to about 18%. We also have, on 
Table B, the fact that the Dutch Reformed Church's political party, the 
Christian Historical Union, is split about 1*0-30% be ween middle to 
upper-class people and blue-collar workers. This pair of circumstances 
suggests that the C.H.U. and the Dutch Reformed Church have been, at 
least for a while, a sort of social cross-over point from Orthodox 
Calvinism to political secularism. The process is slow, taking place 
over generations. It is the kind of social change, coupled with a sud­
den increase in strength and number of splinter parties which has led
some writers, such as Lorwin, Lijphart and others, to suggest that the
13blocs are disappearing. Table C shows this trend as between 191*6 
and 1972 there is a substantial decline in the strength of the Big Five 
parties. This strength was being lost to the newer splinter parties 
rather than to the old ones.
The 1977 election suggests a reversal of this trend as the 
strength of the Christian Democratic Alliance has stabilized, while the 
traditional Socialist and Liberal parties have blossomed into secular 
giants. • The splinters have fallen to half of their previous strength. 
This reversal has taken place since the authors began predicting the 
decline of blocs. In spite of the turmoil, all that has really occurred 
is that there has been a realignment of the blocs toward greater secu­
larism and a united-front approach to politics among the religious 
parties. The discussion so far gives us two characteristics of con­
sociational political parties in the Netherlands:
(l) the distribution of votes among the various political parties 
will be relatively stable, i.e., changes will come from the
56
TABLE C
SECOND CHMBER ELECTIONS IN TEE NETHE5LANDS 
191*6-1959. 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1977 (%)
191+6-
1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977
Labor 29.2 28.0 23.5 21+. 7 27.1+ 35.0
Catholic 30.8 31.9 26.5 21.9 17.7 )
Anti-Revolutionary 11.3 8.7 9.9 8.6 8.8 JC.D.A.
Christian Historical 
Union 8.5 8.6 8.1 6.3 1+.8
) 32.0
Liberal 8.8 10*3 10.7 10.4 11+. 1+ 18.7
Communist 6.3 2.8 3.6 3.9 1+.5 1.3
Political Reformed 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0
t
Ref, Pol. League 0.1+ 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.8 0.6
Pacifist Socialist 0.1+ 3.0 2.9 . 1.1+ 1.5 0.6
Farmers 0.1 2.1 1+.7 1.1 1.9 0.6
Democrats *66 — — 1+.5 6.8 1+.2 5.3
Bern. Socialists *70 — — — 5.3 l+.l 0.6
Radical — — - - 1.8 1+.8 2.0
Roman Catholic 0.9 0.0
Other 1.9 1.5 2.7 3.9 1.1 1.3
Big Five 88.6 87.5 78.7 71.9 73.0 85.7
Old Splinter Parties 9.1+ 8.9 9.1+ 9.2 10.0 5.3
New Splinter Parties 0.1 2.1 9.2 15.0 15.9 8.0
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gradual growth or decline of a political bloc. Although 
parties may gain or lose 3-1+ percentage points, major gains 
or losses (over ten points) will occur only over many years, 
and several elections.
(2) When new parties appear, they will tend to be off-shoots from 
older parties, rather than being completely new parties. In 
non-consociational countries, where parties represent ideo­
logies rather than social units, new parties are created when 
a new ideology becomes popular. In consociational countries, 
splinter parties will tend to represent extreme factions of 
existing blocs. Also, when the need for a splinter is gone, 
the splinter disappears in a short time.
The salient cleavages in Belgium and Luxembourg, unlike the 
Netherlands, have not been broken down by party identification. This 
is because most studies examine only the language problem in Belgium, 
and Luxembourg is so small that few researchers bother to study deeper 
than the surface characteristics. As a result, the linkage between the 
political parties and the social groups can only be established by com­
paring voting patterns with various cleavages. By determining where a 
party*s strength lies, we can ascertain whether there is a relationship 
between group and party. This process, in the case of Belgium, is 
aided greatly by the law which requires separate party machinery in 
each language region. A second indicator of the linkages is a compari­
son of the changes in society with the changes in the parties. In the
*An exception is Democrats *66, a party fostered by young intel­
lectuals during the mid-1900*s. Democrats '66 favors the dissolution 
of the existing systems, seeking to replace the bloc system with a 
pragmatic model.
case of Luxembourg, this is only information which points to the rela-
i
tionship. Although this is probably the weakest of the possible 
approaches, it is .the only one which can be used under the circum­
stances.
Belgian cleavages, as was mentioned earlier, are similar to 
cleavages in the Netherlands, but are further complicated by the pre­
sence of a cleavage arising from a division of language and culture.
The cleavages between Catholics and secularists and between various 
ideological groups on a left-right continuum arose during the l800!s. 
The language crisis did not become a dominant political problem until 
the 1900*3. When the language boundary was established in 1932, Bel­
gium was divided into three regions, Flanders, Wallonia, and the capi-
f
tal, Brussels. Each of these regions is dominated by political affili­
ates of the majority language group, At the same time, these regions 
are not homogeneous enclaves, because, as Shepard Clough noted in a 
study on Belgium cities, as much as five to fifteen percent of a given 
city*s population might be of a different ethnic origin than the major-
15. ity of citizens. Hence, in the study of the individual regimes, we 
can expect that there will be significant minorities which will vote in 
a pattern predominant to another region, i.e., although the division 
shown by the data will be strong, the split will not be perfect.
Before examining the individual regions in Belgium, let us study 
the country as a whole. The various social blocs have political par­
ties, the relationship between the various parties being delineated in 
Figure 1. In 197U> the Flemish section of the Christian Social Party 
(P.S.C.) became the C.V.P., the Christli.jke Volksparti.j. All other 
parties are secular except Yolksunie, which includes some defense of
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FIGURE 1 
BELGIAN PARTIES
Flemish LEFT French
Communist s-
Belgian Socialist Party-
C.V.P.*
Party for Liberty and 
Progress (PVV)-------
Volksunie-
-Communists and Democratic and 
Progressive Union
-Belgian Socialist Party
4/alloon Rally (language)
Democratic Front of Francophones 
“(language) F.D.F.
-P.S.C,
Party for Liberty and Progress 
■(now: Party of refoims and
liberty) PLP-PRLW
RIGHT
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Catholicism in its program of regionalism. Liberal parties, the F W  
(Party of Liberty and Progress) and its French counterpart, the PELW, 
control the secular-right vote.
Table D lists the election returns since 189^4-* The two parties 
which have maintained the largest following since the passage of uni­
versal suffrage in 1919 are the P.S.C. (now PSC-CVP) and the Socialists. 
The P.S.C. attracts relatively conservative, traditional, strong Catho­
lics, mostly from Flanders. The Socialists, on the other hand, repre­
sent the old secular left, attracting the workers from Wallonia where 
the older established industries are located and where traditional 
French egalitarianism is strong.
The Liberals, once a single party, are, functionally, several 
parties because of confusion from the law requiring separate political 
organizations in each region. These parties represent the secular 
middle class, especially those whose traditions arise from French 
Liberalism and egalitarianism which arose during the l800fs. Their 
ideas of egalitarianism are those of old-style liberalism, where indi­
viduals are responsible for their own well-being while the state merely 
forms a framework for their common actions. It is interesting to note 
that except for the sharp decline of 1919 and the great expansion of 
19^9 and 1965, the Liberals have fluctuated only slightly, a few per­
centage points at a time.
The other parties in Belgium have arisen from crises. When the 
Communists and Rexists and new marginal parties blossomed into their 
greatest levels, political turmoil was at its greatest. The Depression 
of the 1930's and the language troubles of the early 1960fs caused many 
individuals to leave the main blocs and join these more militant fringe
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TABLE D 16 
BELGIAN ELECTION BETDBNS 1894-1978
1894 51.6 17.4 28.5 1.3
1896-8 50.7 23.6 22.2 1.6
1900 48.5 20.5 24.3 1.7
1902-4 49.8 20.6 23.3 2.1
1906-8 48.6 21.5 26.7 1.9
1912 51.0 22.0 25.1 0.3
1919 36.0 3 6.6 17.6 2.6 6.5
1921 37.0 32*. & * 18.8 3.0 7.4
1925 36.1 39.3 14.6 3.9 5.9
1929 35.4 36.0 16.6 6.3 5.7
1932 38.6 37.1 14.3 5.9 4.1
'Rexists)1936 27.7 32.1 12.4 7.1 17.6 3.2 (
1939 32.7 30.2 17.2 8.3 11.6 <Comm. & Rex.)
1946 42.5 32.4 9.6 — 12.7 2.7 (Other)
1949 43.6 29.8 15.3 2.1 9.4 (kComm. & other)
1950 47.7 35.? 12.1 — 4.8
1954 41.1 38.5 13.1 2.2 5.1
1958 46.5 37.0 12.0 2.0 2.6
1961 44.5 36.7 11.1 3.5 6.0
1965 34.5 28.3 21.6 6.8 2.4 6.4
1968 31.74 27.99 20.88 9.78 5.9 3.3 .41(Other)
1971 30.05 27.27 16.39 11.11 11.23 3.08 .81
1974 32.34 26.66 15.19 10 <2 10.94 3.23 1.44
1977 35.94 26.43 15.55 9.75 7.7 2.7 1.6
1978 [38.6 12.215.0
10.3
7.0
^6.6
7.0 K 7 ' S
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groups. As troubles subsided, these parties either shrank to a con­
stant figure, as with the Communists' three percent for three consecu­
tive elections, or have vanished completely.
The language parties are of a similar nature, by and large. The 
Flemish Volksunie, the Walloon Bally, and the Front Democratique des 
Francophones of Brussels all arose quickly during the long language 
crisis of the 1960's and, now that the situation is being resolved, 
have gone into a slow decline. Walloon Bally will probably disappear 
over the long run, absorbed by the Socialists. Volksunie may survive 
because it represents a conservative group with some Christian party 
overtones, combining values which would otherwise be lost in the 
middle-of-the-road policies of the Christian Socials. The FDF may 
also survive, for much the same reason; that is, it attracts liberal, 
secular, French-speakers who are not as conservative as the Liberals, 
nor as liberal as the Socialists.
The relationships described above are reinforced by the voting 
patterns in the individual regions. In Wallonia, for example, over 
half of the population voted for leftist parties, most of these having 
voted for the Socialists. The P.S.C., a mass party (no pun intended), 
came in second with about twenty-five percent, while the Liberals 
finished third with about eighteen percent (see Table E).
By contrast, the voting in Flanders reflects different circum­
stances. Except for the ports like Antwerp and a few textile cities 
like Ghent and Brugge (Bruges), most of the factories of Flanders are 
very new, many having been built with money from the American Marshall 
Plan program. When French culture was imported, it spread mostly in 
the cities and among the bourgeoisie. The predominantly agricultural 
lower-class Flemings retained their traditional Catholic outlook, as
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TABLE E1T
REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OP THE 1977 BELGIAN ELECTION
Brussels— 622,820 \ ■ Flanders— 3, 2U6,06I4.
%
P.S.C. 112,932 18.11 C.V.P. 1,1+59,997 hb. 9
P.L.P. 9,738 1.56 P.V.V. 1+75,912 11+.6
P.S.B. c.200,000* 32.11 P.S.B. c.63O,000* c,,20.0*
F.D.F. 237,280 1+3.9 v .tj. 599,631+ 18.1+
R.W. 1,297 .2 P.C. c. 30,000* 1.0
P.C.&Other c. 25,000* 1+.2 Other c. 60,000*
Wallonia— 1,705,31+6
%
P.S.C. 1+30,676 25.25
P.L.P. 319,833 18.75
P.S.B. 61+3,1+28 37.73
R.W. 157,262 9.22
Cartel RW-PSB 33,862 1.98
P.C. 93,517 5.1*8
Other 26,928 1.58
Known
Brussels & Flanders— 3,868,881+
*
P.S.B. 829,901 21.1*5
P.O. $7,901* 1.1*9
Other 62,088 1.6
♦Estimates
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did the nobility and part of the bourgeoisie. Most of the middle class 
was lost to French secularism. This is again borne out by the voting 
described in Table E, where 1+1$ of the vote in Flanders went to the 
C.V.P., the pro-Catholic party, and another 18% went to what amounts 
to the Catholic far right, Yolksunie. Of the secular parties, the lower- 
class Socialist Party, with its mass appeal, did better than did the 
middle-class Liberals (P.V.Y.).
An interesting note is that the language parties from the two 
regions, Yolksunie and Walloon Rally, are off-shoots from the major 
party of the region, Yolksunie from the C.Y.P., and Walloon Rally from 
the Socialists. In addition, the difference in the strength of the 
Communist Party in the two regions sharpens the image- of a liberal 
Wallonia and a conservative Flanders.
The results for Brussels are to be expected from the nature of 
a capital city. The city has traditions of French liberalism which 
controlled the country until the passage of universal suffrage in 1919*
As a capital, it is filled with civil servants, bankers, and a plethora 
of service-type agencies. Hence, Brussels can be characterized as a 
middle-class community. It is not surprising, then, that the FDF, which 
was described above, is the dominant party in the city. The poor 
showing of Walloon Rally suggests that the growth of the FDF represents 
as much a split in the liberal party as a move to protect linguistic 
and cultural integrity. The second-and third-place showings by the 
Socialists and P.S.C. are to be expected as the parties represent the 
older choices of French liberalism and Catholicism. The third 'old* 
party, the Liberals, took a beating because the liberalism of the FDF 
is more acceptable to some modem middle-class liberals than the old-style
bourgeois liberalism.
As expected, the political cleavages in Belgium flow along lines 
of religion and class. Language parties will survive only by being 
convenient vehicles for particular sub-segments of existing blocs.
Most political activity, now that the cultural groups have been safely 
separated, will continue to reflect the cultural backgrounds of the 
parties, but language, per se, will probably decline as a point of 
major political contention. The discussion on language re-emerges 
under the discussion of the elites.
Luxembourg’s cleavages fit the basic pattern attributed to the 
other two Benelux countries in that there are Catholic and secular 
blocs and division along a left-right ideological continuum. The 
governments in the past have worked to prevent other potential cleav­
ages from becoming problems. In the case of religion, the country is 
92% Catholic. Protestant and Jewish minorities are under the protec­
tion of the State, being administered by government-sponsored organi­
zations. Although everyone in Luxembourg speaks the local dialect of 
Letzemburgish, the country is split into bi-lingual or tri-lingual 
bodies, speaking Letzemburgish and French or German, or all three.
The schools are organized bi-lingually so that if a student’s family 
language is French, he is not handicapped in the. pursuit of an educa­
tion. The common use of Letzemburgish provides a comfortable overlap
18
for all language groups.
The cleavages which continue to exist have been exacerbated by 
industrialization. France had exerted a strong influence on Luxem­
bourg, especially among the Francophones of the south-west. In 1839 
most of the south-west, together with most Francophone Luxembourgers
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and a healthy portion of Luxembourg's industrial base, was given to 
Belgium. South-western Luxembourg today is very similar to Belgian 
Luxembourg; it is an old industrial area and tends toward the secular- 
left, especially toward the Socialists. An extreme case is the great 
steel center of Esch-zur-Alette which has a strong Communist enclave.
In 1839, most of the rest of Luxembourg was similar to Flanders, 
that is, it was predominantly Catholic, traditional, conservative, and 
rural. Since the turn of the century, much of this rural population
19has migrated to the industrial cities. As was mentioned in the pre­
vious chapter, these people have tended to join organizations which 
provided familiar surroundings, such as Catholic trade unions and other 
religious organizations.
The bureaucracy, the old nobility, the prelates, and what little 
bourgeoisie that existed encouraged the politicization of Catholic 
values. As these leaders controlled virtually all parliamentary acti­
vity prior to 1867, and controlled the capital city completely, it is 
not surprising that, by the 1930fs, the Catholic party was pre-eminent 
with the Socialist workers placing second in most elections (see Table
F). This division continues to the present day.
This growing division between Catholics and Socialists, created 
by social migration, has been paralleled by changes in other parties. 
Before 191+0, for example, there were some farmers’ parties which were 
independent from the urban-based Catholics. As the rural population 
declined, these parties died out. The real change in Luxembourg poli­
tics, however, is the growth of the secular right and center.
In the 1930's, the Liberals were a small, right-wing, secular 
party. In 1937, the party broke in two, forming the conservative
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Liberal Party and the moderate Democrat Party. In 19^6> these parties 
merged as the Democrat Party. Their strength remained about the same 
for some years with the low ebb coming in the mid-1950's when economic 
confusion arose from problems with the integration of the Benelux coun­
tries. In a show of pro-integration solidarity, many individuals 
rallied to the support of the Christian Social Party’s efforts.
Since 195U> the secular-center and right have blossomed as never 
before because of the increased government efforts to encourage the 
development of service-oriented activities, such as international bank­
ing, rather than relying exclusively on the steel industry to maintain 
economic stability. These efforts have expanded the bureaucracy and 
the number of white-collar workers in private industry to the point 
that there ,are more service-workers than industrial laborers. This ex­
pansion has expanded the middle class and has caused a deterioration 
of ithe solidity of the secular-left.
& Moderate factions in the Socialist and Democrats parties have 
broken with the main body and struck out on their own. In the case of 
the Democrats, the break was short-lived, the faction, known as the 
Mouvement Independent Pouulaire (MIP) having quickly disappeared. The 
Democrats have more recently gained a large number of votes from the 
Christian Social Party and have emerged as a very important political 
unit.
As for the secular left, the Socialists lost a fraction, which 
became the Social Democrats, and which will probably not return to the 
parent party. The PSD represent the part of the Socialist bloc which 
has been drawn into the middle class. Although they adhere to the 
principles of the old bloc, there are differences in programs such that
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the Socialists have been backing policies which threaten the new-found 
livelihood of the PSD voters. The split itself was actually precipi­
tated, for example, by a decision by the main leadership to support the
21
Communists in certain municipal elections.
The Communists, who gain about the same vote at every election with
remarkable consistency, are adherents of Stalin’s approach to creating a
Communist state, such as the destruction of the elements which retard the
transition. For example, they were on record as having praised the 1968
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. To the PSD, the Communists are
too fundamentally different to indulge in any association.
.v The cleavages in Luxembourg have changed insofar as an alteration
in the basic structure of society; the expansion of the middle class
has caused the blocs themselves to change in size and has created a new
bloc, the Social Democrats.
Do these cleavages create institutionalized political blocs? The
outer trappings, such as media and labor-union organization, do inai-
22cate a high degree of segmentation, but there may still be some ques­
tion as to whether the relationship between bloc and party characteris­
tic of consociational democracies is present here. The only real means 
to determine this, given the scarcity of information on Luxembourg, is 
to briefly re-examine the nature of political activity in Germany. In 
both Germany and Luxembourg, there are three relevant political parties, 
discrete social cleavages, and cooperative, moderate political inter­
action. Germany’s political parties are catch-all parties, i.e., al­
though a party may be especially attractive to a particular group, the 
political party does not identify itself with that group alone, seeking 
instead to maximize votes by issuing a general appeal. In Germany, the
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lower classes were brought into the political arena as a new, distinct
unit, the Social Democratic Party, independent of the upper- and middle-
class factions already extant. Since the 1950's, the Social Democrats
have modified their goals and programs so as to be attractive to a
23
broader range of voters.
Luxembourg’s workers were incorporated into the existing frame­
work of political interaction by elite encouragement. Bather than 
creating new influences, then, the workers have expanded support for 
the existing system. Since the existing elites were divided into pro- 
Catholic and pro-secular groups, it is a reasonable supposition, then, 
that the segmentation of society is present in the relationship between 
the political parties and society, and that the political interaction 
in Luxembourg can be explained by consociationalism.
The examination of the three Benelux countries has shown that the 
changes in social blocs caused by social migration and economic expan­
sion are paralleled by changes in the strength and number of political 
parties. We have also seen that the blocs can, if circumstances demand 
it, split into factions. The maintenance of relations between those 
factions require the same kind of interaction that would be expected 
between the blocs themselves. Elite activity, then, plays a vital role 
in coordinating the efforts of the blocs. It is in this light that we 
turn to the discussion of consociational elites.
Elite Interaction
The second characteristic in Lijphart’s description of consocia­
tional politics has two parts: first, that elites have the ability to
accommodate diverse interests of rival sub-cultures and, secondly, that 
the elites are able to transcend cleavages and to join in common efforts
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with, elites of rival sub-cultures. We have already seen that both 
elites and society as a whole have been cultured by the mechanics of 
the system to recognize the legitimacy and integrity of other social 
groups, and to seek the good of their group through the growth of the 
whole. What we seek in this section is some indicator which shows 
that the different elites are indeed working together and some speci­
fic qualities of the political systems which permit this kind of elite 
interaction.
The discussion in the previous chapter provided a relatively 
simple means to determine if the elites of rival sub-cultures can 
interact for the mutual benefit of the sub-cultures. It was discovered 
that, in the case of segmented societies, the elites of a given social 
groups will be, by and large, congruent with the political party which 
represents,the group. There may be other individuals who exert an 
influence on policy-making, but the visible elite interaction will be 
in the hands of the parties. Carrying this a step further, the ability 
of the* elites to interact will be shown by the ability of the parties 
to associate freely in coalitions, regardless of ideological or reli­
gious conviction.
What about other characteristics of coalitions? The rate of change 
from one coalition to another should be relatively slow, about the rate 
of the regular elections. This slow rate exists because the Cabinet 
is not so likely to be brought down because of ideological questions as 
would occur in say France or Italy. Policy is given a greater chance 
to succeed because the Opposition is not utterly opposed to any and 
every Cabinet proposal. Variance from this norm, however, is not 
necessarily significant as special elections arise from special
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circumstances. Over the long run, the rate of change should not 
approach that of a new cabinet being created every year or so, as 
occurs in Italy, but some rapid changes are not impossible.
The party that produces the prime minister is not significant 
either, as a formateur, a person who must form a cabinet coalition, 
may be chosen because of their leadership within the party, their 
popularity among the members of other parties, or because, even though 
an individual may hold only a middle-range position in his party, the 
monarch has been advised of the individual’s integrity, intelligence, 
and wise policies. When coalitions are formed, the prime minister 
might not even be from the majority party. In short, a prime minister 
could be from any party, even though the tendency in the long run is 
to give the position to the head of the biggest party. This trait is 
not found exclusively in the Benelux countries, but also occurs in 
Prance and other competitive systems.
Tables G, H, and I delineate the coalitions in the three Benelux 
countries over the last forty or so years. Although some coalitions, 
especially in Luxembourg, contain the same parties, the actual arrange­
ment of the coalition depends on the size of the electoral victory. A 
substantial victory by one party will give it grounds to demand a pro­
portional increase in the number of ministries that it controls.
We can see in the case of the Netherlands (Table G) that even 
though electoral success has moved from party to party, few parties 
have formed coalitions without crossing ideological or religious lines. 
This is shown strongly in the results of the 1972 and 1977 elections.
In the early 1970's, as has been mentioned, scholars like Lorwin 
and Lijphart felt that the blocs were fragmenting and that, as a result,
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TABLE G
THE NETHERLANDS: CABINET COALITIONS, 1933-1977
1933 ARP, Catholic, Radical, Liberal
1937 C.H.1J., ARP, Labor (then Social-Democrats), Liberal, Catholic
19¥ Catholi c, Labor
1948 Labor, Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U.
1952 Labor, Catholic, ARP, C.H.U.
1956 Labor, Catholic, ARP, C.H.U.
1959 Catholics, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP
1963 Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP
1967 Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP
1971 Labor, Democrats, ’66, Catholic, ARP
1972 Labor, Democrats ’66, Radical, Catholic, ARP
1977 C.D.A. (Catholic, C.H.U., ARP), Liberals
NOTE; The first party in each coalition is the dominant party. In 
1977> Labor won a relative majority, but could not negotiate 
an absolute majority coalition.
7U
consociational democracy was in decline. This tendency was recognized 
by Joop den Uyi's Labor (Socialist) Party which felt that this trend 
was good and sought to capitalize upon it. Their intention was to dis­
solve the blocs entirely to allow more rapid social reform. They hoped 
to build sufficient support among Labor1s allies to create an absolute 
majority (more than 50% of the seats), thus making accommodation with 
religious and secular-right parties unnecessary. Although they did 
unite a substantial part of the left, their efforts, for better or for 
worse, fell short of the mark.
In response to the challenge of den Uyl, the religious parties 
and the right-secular bloc also reformed their policies. They continue 
to compromise but are cautious in their interaction. Labor, the 
Liberals, and the C.D.A. each have enough votes to prevent any one of 
the other two from forming a majority coalition with splinter parties 
alone. Two of the three is the minimum combination for forming any 
coalition, except for the weakest of minorities. At the same time, 
the splinter panties represent so many different attitudes that creat­
ing a consensus among them would be difficult. In short, the distribu­
tion of authority has returned to a somewhat altered, yet generally 
unchanged, form of the pre-1960 arrangement.
The I972 den Uyl government, which had consisted of the Labor
Party, the Radicals, Democrats *66, the Catholics, and the A.R.P.,
could not be rebuilt after the 1977 elections. Attempts to combine
Labor with the new C.D.A. failed. Instead, a center-right coalition
25
of the C.D.A. and the Liberals was formed under Van Agt.
The results of these elections suggest that, in the Netherlands 
rule by a single bloc, in this case the secular-left bloc of Labor,
Democrats *66 and the Radical Party, is not yet politically possible. 
Successful government still depends upon the ability of the diverse 
elites to negotiate mutually agreeable programs. The consolidation of 
the religious parties and the general decline of the small parties 
indicate that the deterioration of the blocs has slowed and the blocs 
are once again becoming rigid.
Table E lists the Belgian coalitions including changes which did 
not involve elections. As with the Dutch, the Belgians join freely in 
coalitions, regardless of ideological or religious preference. In a 
country with several major cleavages, it is interesting to note that 
the results of the last two elections indicate that the people expected 
coalition members to behave in a consociational fashion.
In 1975, Walloon;Rally joined a coalition of C.V.P. (Flemish 
Catholic) and Liberals. In 1977» W.R. leaders claimed that Prime Minis­
ter Leo Tindemans was moving too slowly on implementing programs to 
jurisdictionaliy separate Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, and had 
acted improperly when he had dismissed two cabinet ministers who were 
members of Walloon Rally. Walloon Rally backed out of the coalition.
In the ensuing election, Walloon Rally was dealt a crushing defeat,
2 7
falling from 7% of the vote to 2.$3%» The Flemish Catholics, Tinde­
mans * party, garnered an extra three percent of the vote, a strong vote 
of confidence.
Tindemans formed a new coalition of his CVP, Walloon Socialists, 
Volksunie (Flemish regionalists), and the Front Democratique des 
Francophones (FDF), a Brussels-based Francophone party. In October 
1978, Volksunie began pressuring Tindemans to alter certain policies 
regarding the implementation of the regional arrangement. Volksunie
76
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TABLE H ;
BELGIAN COALITIONS, 1946-1978
Elections Duration
1946-1949 Socialist (minority) i
Socialist + Liberal + Communist 4
Socialist + Liberal + Communist 7i
Socialist + Catholic 29
1949 Catholics + Liberal 10
1950-1954 Catholic 2
Catholic 16
Catholic 27
1954-1958 Socialist + Liberal 51
1958-1961 Catholic 4
Catholic + Liberal 30
1961-1965 Catholic + Socialist 51
1965-1968 Catholic + Socialist 8
Catholic + Liberal 23
1968-1971 Catholic + Socialist 41
1971-1974 Catholic + Socialist 10
Catholic + Socialist + Liberal 12
1974-1977 Flemish Catholic + Liberal (minority) 12
Flemish Catholic + Liberal + Walloon Rally 22
1977 Flemish Catholic + Walloon Socialists + Volksunie
+ F,D.F. 18
1978 Catholic + Walloon Socialists + F.D.F. (pro tern)
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finally pulled out of the coalition, forcing’ Tindemans to resign. In
the election of December 1978, Volksunie suffered a similar fate to the
one that its Walloon counter-part had suffered in the previous election,
losing 6 of its 21 seats. The CVP and its Walloon counter-part, the
Parti Social-Chr etien, had, in the meantime, climbed to over 38% of
29
the vote, its highest total in almost twenty years.
The efforts of the Belgian elites to end the language problem 
has helped reinstate the older pattern of cleavages, at least in part. 
The traditional powers in Flanders, the CVP and the Liberals are re­
asserting themselves. The parties in Brussels are entering a new order 
with an emphasis on moderate secular liberalism. The crisis seems to 
have abated.
Luxembourg, as indicated in Table I, has been controlled by 
Christian-Social-led coalitions for seme time. These coalitions, how­
ever, are not always the same two parties, and even when they are, re­
shuffling of portfolios among ministers and numerical redistribution 
of-appointments to ministerial positions is by no means uncommon. The 
only significant change that has taken place in Luxembourg's political 
atmosphere in many years is the recent expansion of the Democrat party, 
the secular middle class. In one election, they have jumped from being 
a perennial also-ran to the head of a coalition..
In Luxembourg, in Belgium, and in the Netherlands, one fact is 
apparent: no bloc can form a coalition with other blocs unless it is
willing to negotiate with those other blocs from the standpoint of 
mutual legitimacy. There is, in addition, a tendency for fragmentation 
of the individual blocs to be limited. Coalitions, even with the five 
blocs of the Netherlands, tend to revolve around the parties which can
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TABLE
CABINET COALITIONS IN LUXEMBOURG, 1937-1974
Seats
1937 Catholic* & Liberal** 16/26
1946 P.S.C., Socialists, Democrats, Communists SO/51
1948 P.S.C. & Socialists 37/51
1951 P.S.C. & Socialists 39/52
1954 P.S.C. & Socialists 1*3/52
1959 P.S.C. & Democrats 32/52
1964 P.S.C. & Socialists 1*3/56
1968 P.S.C. & Socialists 39/56
1971 P.S.C. & Socialists 33/56
1974 Democrats & Socialists 31/59
*P.S.C.
**Democrats
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most consistently maintain a strong following from their individual 
bloc.
How do these coalitions function, or more precisely, what aspects
of political behavior permit the elites to behave in a moderate fashion?
The answer to this is different in each country, but, by and large,
moderate behavior arises from a system of informal or formal rules.
The Dutch use a system based on informal rules which Arend Lijphart has
31
termed "unwritten, informal and implicit." There are seven of these 
rules, several of which over-laps
(1) the business of government,
(2) agreement to disagree,
(3) summit diplomacy,
(4) proportionality,
(5) depoliticization,
(6) secrecy,
(7) the government’s right to govern.
Two rules which are especially closely related are (l) the busi-
32
ness of politics, and (7) the government’s right to govern. For the 
Dutch, .political interaction is an activity which is geared toward 
problem-solving rather than ideological victories. This does not mean 
that ideologies are abandoned but rather that the elites seek to fulfill 
goals for their blocs through compromise with other groups rather than 
holding their position to be an all-or-nothing demand.
The cabinets are expected to operate efficiently with little 
interference from the opposition parties in the States-General in the 
day-to-day functions of the national government. Although individual 
attitudes concerning desirable policies vary, ”. . .  doctrinal disputes
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33should not be allowed to stand in the way of getting the work done.” 
This approach to government is contrasted with French politics. 
For the French, politics is not viewed in the same light as it is in 
the Netherlands. Questions of economic and social welfare are viewed 
as political questions, that is, they are argued for their philosophi­
cal or ideological, rather than purely functional, qualities. If the 
Gaullists were to suddenly abandon their functional programs and em­
brace those of the Communists, the two would, in spite of their practi­
cal agreement, probably continue opposing one another on most other 
levels, e.g., international, because their ideological attitudes would 
still be at variance. In short, attitudes, not programs, govern France.
Two other rules mentioned by Lijphart are, in effect, trade-offs 
which allow the blocs to feel confident that the Cabinet is not likely 
to harm them, even though the party with the most votes speaks with 
the biggest voice. These rules are (2) agreement to disagree and (5)
3k
depoliticization. In the former case, the Dutch recognize that indi­
viduals have different beliefs and that these beliefs need not be 
changed. Toleration of the convictions of others is seen as mandatory.
"Disagreements must not be allowed to turn into either mutual contempt
36
or proselytizing zeal.” The principle here is not that all legisla­
tion must be absolutely acceptable to all parties, but that widely 
divergent opinions on one subject should not be allowed to stand in the 
way of possible cooperation on other, more immediate questions. Politi­
cal interaction is not, therefore, a matter simply of majority rule. 
Recognizing that antagonism in the present only reinforces future con­
flict, the elites approach legislation with a primary goal of reaching 
a generally acceptable agreement.
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The idea of depoliticization arises from the same principle, hut
it works from different perspectives. Agreement to disagree implies a
desire of individual leaders to limit their fervor in defending their
groupfs interests. Depoliticization is the act of making programs
politically neutral so that the program is not especially offensive to
a particular group.
Lijphart cites two examples. In the first case, opinions in a
four-party coalition on colonial policy were so divergent that the only
alternatives were to table the question, which would mean the policy
would continue, or to try to solve it, which would cause deadlock. The
37matter was tabled and business proceeded as usual. In a second case,
a piece of legislation involving a lottery was opposed by the Anti-
revolutionary Party on religious grounds. Although supporters had the
necessary majority, they continued debates until compromises could be
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worked out which would be attractive to the AEP.
-t Lijphartfs third and sixth characteristics are summit diplomacy 
39and secrecy. These two characteristics are closely allied. When cir­
cumstances demand, leaders of the various parties can meet in private 
to work on problems which require inputs from more than just the ruling 
coalition. As moderation and compromise may sometimes give the appear­
ance of selling-out one's constituents, the compromises are best made 
in private. The ability to deal in secret allows the elites to follow 
rule (2), the agreement to disagree.^
Lijphart terms his final point 'proportionality1, that is, when 
parliament passes legislation, the distribution of funds is, by custom, 
already set according to the proportion of individuals who formed each 
bloc. Whether it be funds for schools, membership in the Civil Service,
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appointments for burgomeister, or whatever,' the funds of positions are 
distributed according to the proportion demanded by the array of rele­
vant social blocs. Although this sounds arbitrary, it must be remem­
bered that, while the legislation was being passed, it was already being
; ip. , '
designed to suit the needs of the various social blocs (see Rule 2),
This last point is perhaps the most significant as it includes 
the concept of the mutual recognition of the discreteness of the indi­
vidual blocs. In France, the government is run to suit the will of the 
majority, the parties that won the election. In the Netherlands, on 
-the .other hand, the government runs its programs in a fashion which will 
fit the needs of as many of the various groups as possible, based upon 
the size of the group and the problems that it faces.
What the Dutch do by informal traditions, the Belgians do by
statutes in the national constitution. Proportionality and the govem-
k2ment*s right to govern are the primary goals of these statutes. While
many countries1 governments operate exclusively on a system of checks
and balances controlling the abuse of power by a particular branch,
Belgium, as was suggested in the previous chapter, relies on concrete
rules of order to permit closer coordination of the efforts of the
1*3
executive and the legislature. Although a system of checks and 
balances does exist, Belgian law evolves in the legislative hall rather 
than appearing fully grown from a council chamber.^ Hence, an MP could 
conceivably make -unnecessary demands concerning the functioning of the 
bureaucracy in exchange for approval of some other measure. The con­
stitution, however, is worded so that parliament is obliged to allow 
the government to attend to the business of running the country. MP’s 
may ask questions concerning substance and procedure in new legislation,
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but existing programs cannot be modified, except by extreme measures 
such as dissolution of parliament.
Recognizing the presence of diverse social groups, the Belgians 
were obliged to make allowances for the needs of all groups; the legis­
lation was amended so that similar benefits were extended to other 
relevant groups, in proportion to the size of the groups. In .summary, 
then, Belgium operates from a system of legally-mandated proportional­
ity and right of the government to govern.
In the case of Luxembourg, there is virtually no information on 
how the elites approach policy-making. All that there is to go on are 
the results of political activity, such as the compromise on schools, 
where all schools are run by the state, but are under clerical influ­
ence with regard to such procedures as which texts are most suitable. 
Law is made for the general welfare and yet it is shaped to fit the
bSdesires of the individual groups. Functionally, then, Luxembourg 
works in the same fashion as its Dutch and Belgian neighbors.
Symbols of National Unity
The third of Lijphart1s characteristics of consociational poli­
tics is the presence of some common symbol of national unity. Each of 
the three countries contain social blocs which have evolved into a 
single -unit in terms of national identity. One aid in this evolution 
has been the monarch, who represents the state as a whole. Cabinets 
rise and fall, social blocs wax and wane, but the regime itself sym­
bolized by the monarch is sacrosanct. All tradition is embodied in 
the monarch, and, indeed, the monarchs provide all three countries with 
a sense of continuity in the face of a changing world. Although all 
three countries display these influences, we need only examine one—
Bh
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Belgium— to see how the influences work in practice. Focusing on the 
Belgian kings alone may seem peculiar, hut as we remember from the 
discussions in Chapter Two, all three monarchs have surrendered most 
of their power to the legislatures and, of the three, only the Belgian 
kings are constitutionally obliged to remain involved in more than 
ceremonial activity. This means that the Belgian kings display the 
greatest scope of involvement and, hence, have the highest profiles.
In the Belgian kings, we are seeing the most active monarchs possible.
The Belgian royal house, Saxe-Coburg, is neither Flemish nor 
Walloon, but German. As such, the monarchy is unaligned on questions 
of social justice, representing all the Belgian people. The kings of 
Belgium have always had an active role in politics. Wielding more 
authority than their Butch counterparts, they have often promoted 
legislation or have intervened to resolve a deteriorating situation.
In 181*6, for example, Leopold I was informed of the concern held by 
some for the safety of Flemish culture which was being buried by French 
influences and by a "French in the parlor, Flemish in the kitchen" 
attitude.^ He began a series of annual festivals and competitions
I rj
devoted to the advancement of Flemish culture. Likewise, it was a
royal initiative to propose Edmond Leburton for Prime Minister in 1971
even though Leburton did not lead the majority party. Finally, it was
also a royal initiative to call for elections in 197lj-> when Leburton
1*8
could not resolve a crisis.
As the monarchs are symbols of nationhood, it is mandatory that 
they avoid becoming tarnished. In 195bi as was previously mentioned, 
questions were raised regarding the conduct of Leopold III during World 
War I. A referendum showed that Sk% of the people supported the King.
A breakdown of the vote showed that while the King was well supported 
in Flanders, only 2*8^  of the Francophones supported him. Rather than 
risk becoming a 'Flemish* king to his Francophone subjects, Leopold
1+9abdicated.
The Benelux countries represent a variety of backgrounds: pro­
vincial, monarchical, religious and linguistic. The cleavages of Luxem­
bourg seem minor compared to those of its Benelux partners, but it 
should be remembered that without the benefit of the works of such 
writers as Lijphart and Daalder, few people who had not made a study 
of the Netherlands would be aware of the sharpness of the cleavages in 
the Netherlands. The important quality that is shared by the three 
countries is that each country's social blocs have been politicized 
in such a way that political parties tend to correspond to social or 
ideological blocs, i.e., there is a close correlation between the 
characteristics of an individual and the party for which he votes.
The blocs, to be sure, do not chase away potential converts, but they 
do present distinct qualities and work to maintain that distinctive­
ness.
The other important quality of consociational countries is their 
approach to political activity. Perhaps the most obvious characteris­
tics are (l) that the elites tend to approach programs in terms of 
trade-offs and compromises, gearing their individual goals to the 
desires and needs of the whole, and (2) that the elites pursue their 
task in a business-like fashion, seeking to resolve problems when pos­
sible and to by-pass problems when a ready solution is not available.
In contrast to this, we have the example of the French and Italians, 
who approach politics from the stand-point of ideological purity. For
them, the sacrifice of an ideological position is far worse than the 
seeming chaos of the political system. Operating from the position 
that their individual group has the best conceivable program, to create 
flaws in it in the name of "accommodation” is little more than a betra­
yal of one's party and one's constituency.
The consociational elites do not seek compromise for its own 
sake, but rather seek to gain part of their goals, which is to say 
benefits for their group* by a process of bargaining with trade-offs. 
Hence, political competition is just as intense in consociational coun­
tries, and negotiation just as difficult, but competition is more in­
formal and tends to be obscured by the accommodative practices which 
are seen on the surface.
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CONCLUSION
CHARACTERISTICS OP CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY
In the preceding chapters, we examined the major theories of 
consociational democracy and then analyzed them in the light of the 
experience of the Benelux countries. "When we "began the study, we 
wanted to know how consociational countries developed, and if these 
countries had particular qualities which could he identified and dif­
ferentiated from those in non-consociational countries. Chapter Two 
examined the countries in terms of their socio-cultural development, 
allowing us to discover the source of consociational democracy; Chap­
ter Three, in turn, provided information on the specific consociational 
qualities.
In Chapter Two, two points seemed especially significant:
Daalderfs theory of consociational development, and the concept of 
mutual recognition of legitimacy. Daalder proposed that consociational 
political activity, moderate interaction among elites of distinct groups, 
pre-dated the development of tension between the groups. As larger 
units of society were enfranchised, the elites provided, in the words 
of Rose and Urwin, a framework for the political mobilization of these 
people. The social groups made this arrangement as a channel for 
grievances, allowing their elite to handle interaction with other elites 
in a manner to which the elite had grown accustomed. As a result, the 
mutual accommodation practiced by the early elites became the modus
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operandi of the elites of the new social blocs.
A good way to describe this process is through the concept of 
legitimacy. As the patterns of elite interaction evolved, and. as the 
masses entered the political framework provided by the elites, in short, 
as the whole system developed, political development was based on the 
recognition of a right or propriety of each group to exist as legiti­
mate units. This mutual recognition of legitimacy occurs on three 
levels:
(1) There is, on the part of all social groups, recognition of 
the right of the other groups of society to exist as* dis­
crete parts of the system;
(2) The elites of the social groups are recognized by their group, 
by other groups, and, especially, by the elites of those other 
groups as legitimate representatives of their group;
(3) There is a common recognition by both elites and masses of the 
legitimacy of the regime, that is, all parties recognize that 
they are part of a single political unit, and that their for­
tunes are bound to the fortunes of all groups that recognize 
the common allegiance.
In short, legitimacy occurs on three levels: social groups, elites,
and the whole regime. The good of the individual unit is bound to the
good of the whole.
These three facets of a political system, social groups, the 
elites, and the State, were examined in terms of the specific qualities 
of political interaction in Chapter Three. This examination allows us 
to describe each of the facets, and the type of interaction and inter­
relationships which occur in a consociational democracy.
A consociational democracy is generated by political interaction 
between discrete social blocs. Although other countries have reinforc­
ing cleavages in society, the cleavages in a consociational country are 
institutionalized. Each group provides its own means of dissemination
of information throughout the group, that is, each group has its own 
leaders, media, social and professional organizations, and at times, 
its own educational system. The most important quality of social blocs 
in a consociational country, however, is that each bloc generates its 
own political party, the political party representing the political 
elite of the social group. To determine if a country has its social 
cleavages arranged in a consociational pattern then, we must examine 
the relationship between the major social groups and the relevant poli­
tical parties.
In Chapter Three, we discovered three methods for discerning this 
relationship. The first method is to determine the relationship between 
party preference and social group. In a consociational country, identi­
fication by members of a particular group with one of the parties will 
be extremely strong. We find that knowledge of the social group to 
which an individual belongs allows us to determine his political affilia­
tion and vice versa.
A second possible method is to compare the voting patterns in the 
various regions to the array of social groups. We can expect in most 
cases that, as each group has its own socio-political attitudes, those 
attitudes will be reflected in the voting pattern of the regions where 
a specific group predominates. This method is not as precise as the 
actual comparison of party preference to social group because the data 
can be obscured by the presence of enclaves from other groups. As a 
result, it is best that this method be used in tandem with the third 
method, the comparison of changes in the strength of the political 
parties to changes in society.
In a consociational system, the political parties are reflections
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of the social groups. If charges in the parties are congruent with 
the social change, then we can expect that a consociational system is 
present. Certain specific qualities of consociational political parties 
were noted from examinations which used this method. By and large, 
changes in party strengths will "be slow, "because changes in attitudes 
or in social groups generally occur only over the passage of a long 
period of time. 2Tew parties will be generated by two influences: 
either by the expansion and defection of a particular sub-group, or by 
an extremist wing breaking free in a time of crisis. In the former 
case, the new party will continue to exist as long as the sub-group 
recognizes a need for independence from the groups to which it had ad- 
heredi In the case of extremist parties, these parties exist as long 
as -a perceived threat or need exists, then go into a rapid decline. In 
both cases, new parties will be obvious off-shoots of the older parties.
- These three methods allow us to determine if politicized social 
cleavages exist in a given country because they show the close relation­
ship between the social blocs and their elites. The second facet of 
political activity, elite interaction, is equally important in the dis­
cussion of consociational democracy because it is the ability of the 
elites to work together in a system of compromise and mutual accommoda­
tion which gives consociational democracy its moderate political 
atmosphere.
Prom our earlier discussion, we know that consociational elites 
recognize the legitimacy of other elites to act as representatives of 
other groups. They also recognize the right of other elites to assume 
a leadership role in determining common policy. These elite character­
istics are shown by the way in which parties associate and by the formal
9h
or tacit rules which govern elite interaction.
The most convenient measure of the willingness of consociational 
elites to work together is shown by Cabinet coalitions. In consocia­
tional systems, the parties associate without regard for ideological 
or religious background, but rather with a desire to establish a work­
able coalition. Eence, coalitions can be formed freely among the vari­
ous political parties.
Elite interaction is governed by rules of the game which have been 
established by traditional custom and usage. These rules may vary in 
exact form from country to country, but the political foundation for the 
rule will be the same.
(k) A Cabinet has a right to govern in a business-like fashion.
(b ) The benefits of legislation will be distributed according to 
proportionality, that is, each group receives its fair share.
(C) Political negotiations between elites can be carried out by 
means of ftsummit diplomacy" and in secrecy.
The first of these rules reflects the recognition of elites that 
certain members of their body, although from a different group, can 
assume a leadership role in the policy-making process. Although these 
elites who are not in the Cabinet can oppose policy, it is opposed be­
cause it is not the best policy, not because it is someone else’s policy. 
The second rule is a reciprocal arrangement between elites with regard 
to the first rule. While the Opposition leaders are.expected to act in 
a judicious fashion, the Cabinet is expected, in turn, to recognize the 
rights of the other blocs. An electoral majority does not give license 
to the Cabinet to ignore the other blocs, but rather gives the respon­
sibility of taking basic policy and amending it so that no group suffers 
from that policy.
The third rule, summit diplomacy and secrecy, arises from the
95
recognition by the blocs of the elites1 right to govern. Acting as 
representatives of the individual blocs, the elites must approach 
policy flexibly so that the needs of individual blocs can be fulfilled 
by mutual accommodation. The ability of elites to interact in what 
Lehmbruch termed intense, informal discussion points to a high level 
of trust placed in the elites by the blocs as a whole.
The three rules then could also be described as the mutual 
recognition of legitimacy between elites, the recognition of the rights 
of the individual blocs, and the recognition by the blocs of the elites’ 
ability to act as legitimate representatives. These perceptions in­
clude all of the facets of a political system except one, the State it­
self.
The State represents the common interests shared by all of the 
members of society, the sense of community. It transcends all cleav­
ages and provides a point of reference to which all groups can look to 
for .protection. Even though individuals may not like members of a cer­
tain other group, all parties can look to the same ultimate source of 
sovereign authority, whether it be symbolized by a monarch or by a set 
of common traditions. At the same time, we found in our discussion 
that this symbol of national unity should remain sacrosanct, free from 
tarnish in the eyes of the majorities in all relevant groups. If it 
seems to one group that the symbol is associated with an opposing group, 
then the situation must be repaired. A symbol is a legitimate point of 
reference only if it has the same attraction to all groups.
The symbol of national unity’s most important quality, beyond 
providing a point of commonality, is that it gives the system a sense 
of continuity in the face of change. Even though cabinets and leaders
may rise and fall, and social groups wax and wane, the symbol remains 
as an umbrella over all political interaction.
AFTERWORD
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The Benelux countries, as moderate polities, represent one of 
two types of political activity which can exist in a country with 
politicized social cleavages. The other type is the competitive sys­
tem of Prance, where groups seek to achieve goals which reflect the 
ideals of their group alone. This situation is the same as the inter­
national system, where there are countries which favor cooperation for 
mutual "benefit and those which seek to gain regardless of the cost to 
others. These attitudes are not discrete, "but in fact represent a con­
tinuum of ideas ranging from strong competition to limited cooperation 
to strong cooperation. How could this understanding of socio-political 
activity affect the internal or external politics of countries?
With regard to internal politics, Hans Daalder has suggested that 
it is not only possible, but perhaps necessary for developing countries 
to employ a consociational approach to the maintenance and expansion of 
their regime.^- Many new countries have boundaries which have little 
regard for social identification, but rather were laid down by Europeans 
to divide spheres of influence. Countries like Zaire have upwards of 
two hundred and fifty separate tribes which must be psychologically 
inculcated with the concept of belonging to a single nation. Daalder 
suggests that the most convenient means would be to build on old founda­
tion such as tribal councils or similar bodies so that individuals come
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to attach the development of their tribe or religious group to the
2
growing well-being of the whole state. In countries with on-going 
crises, like Bolivia, Northern Ireland, or Spain, the implementations 
of a consociational system would assuredly be more difficult, but as 
the system is a product of attitudes, and attitudes can change over 
time, the construction of such a system is not utterly impossible.
In the broader context of the international system, the same 
rules apply. If the general public can be influenced to believe a 
particular goal is best, then the system can be altered so that that 
goal is pursued. We can examine this approach on three levels, coop­
eration between countries which are forced to cooperate, those which 
only wish limited cooperation, and thos9 which feel cooperation is the 
best possible course of action.
Cooperation is often forced upon competitive groups when a com­
mon threat presents itself. Usually cooperation will take the form 
of a loose association such as an alliance. By its very nature, an 
alliance tends to fade in importance over time. In the first place, 
an alliance is formed to guarantee peace, either by presenting a united 
front to an external threat or by unity under some dominant alliance- 
member to insure peace among the alliance members (collective security). 
When the threat— either internal or external— is no longer a threat, 
then the necessity of maintaining tight coordination also fades. A 
good example of this is the alliance that developed during the 19^0 fs 
between Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, et al., 
which lasted only as long as Germany was fighting. When Germany fell, 
the alliance, being purely a military convenience, collapsed. The 
alliance achieved its purpose, but could do no more. If Hitler's
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Germany had lasted longer, so too would the alliance.
The collapse of an alliance is not bad in and of itself as long 
as it was able to achieve its hoped-for result. It is quite often im­
possible for more to be accomplished because alliances are intended to
i  ■■
freeze the international status quo. No country gives special privi­
leges to other countries beyond what is necessary for joint action, 
and no country gives up any of its sovereign right to independent ac­
tion. In a purely competitive system, then, each country is respon­
sible only to itself. The good of the country is defined in terms 
which emphasise the independence of action rather than interdependence.
>A system of limited cooperation is based upon the recognition 
that the events in different countries are interdependent, that the 
internal policies of one country, e.g., economic policy, can influence 
international situations. If conquest is impossible, then countries 
must resort to cooperation to influence these otherwise discrete events. 
It is in this type of forum that consociational countries begin to make 
their presence known.
Consociational elites are professional bargainers, dealing daily 
with situations demanding complex negotiations. Their goal is to reach 
a mutually acceptable compromise which will yield the greatest benefit 
possible for their individual group. The transfer to an international 
gathering seeking the common good is not, therefore, substantially dif­
ferent from activity at home.
In this regard, Robert S. Wood and J. L. Heldring have produced 
works which describe the Dutch approach to politics within the confines 
of the European Community as communitarian, that is, the Dutch are 
actively promoting policies which will bind the countries of the E. C.
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3into a strong unit both economically and politically. Their efforts 
have not stopped there, but rather have been geaxed toward the expan­
sion of the Community to include important actors which were not at 
first part of the Community, such as Great Britain. Eeldring and Wood, 
in their articles, both agreed that the Butch were trying to promote a 
system which had united several provinces into a single unit as a means 
of gradually integrating several States on the international level.
Within the European Community, the common political attitudes of 
the six original countries were much the same as the Butch position.
In 1958> when France came under the control of Charles de Gaulle, the 
situation changed. While the Butch remained ostentatiously pro­
integration, the French sought instead to use the framework of the E. C. 
to establish economic hegemony for themselves over Europe. The struggle 
became one of ’greater Holland’, the gradual unification of separate 
provinces, against ’greater France*, the retention of older national­
isms.
Today the position has altered slightly with the primary obstacles 
to integration arising from economic difficulties and from recalcitrance 
on the part of the British. The economic difficulties arise from unem­
ployment, the energy crisis, and the deteriorating position of the Uni­
ted States in the international economic system. As for the British, 
they are simply not convinced of the advisability of strong integra­
tion. In spite of all of these problems, the Butch efforts, now joined 
by most other E. C. members, are continuing.
Strong cooperation exists when all of the actors agree, tacitly 
at least, that cooperation is the best approach to generating benefits 
and minimizing losses. A system of limited cooperation can drift to
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this level from time to time, but the ideal results occur when coopera­
tion is the policy, no matter who is running the Cabinet, Strong 
cooperation exists among the Benelux countries, stronger than in any 
other international economic organization. In spite of the difficul­
ties involved, such as the massive exchange rate adjustments necessary 
to prevent wage and price imbalances,^ problems have been viewed as 
obstacles to be overcome rather than reasons for abandoning the program 
entirely. The Benelux countries, which have resisted unification in 
the past, are now building a union based on the same principles used 
to govern the individual countries: the good of the part is bound to
the good of the whole, and every group gets its fair share. It may 
well be, therefore, that the consociationalism practiced in each Bene­
lux state has enabled them to engender successful policies of modera­
tion and accommodation in their relations with each other.
NOTES— AFTERWOED
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1Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations,” p. 368.
2Ibid.
’Robert S. Wood, "Europe and the Communitarian Image in Dutch 
Foreign Policy,” Internationale Spectator 26, 9 (1973)2826. See also 
J. lie Heldring, "Europe: A Greater Holland?" Internationale Spectator, 
1961+, cited in Wood.
^"Origin, Object, and Operation of the Benelux Economic Union" 
(Brussels: Secretariat-General of Benelux,, 1976), p. 1.
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